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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The

international

legal

established nor as definitive as

most of

all,

despite an

regime as

it

They

pertains

to

human

rights

is

neither

from many disadvantages.

as

First

and

enormous normative development and wave of changes,

the

it

appears.

suffer

international legal regime has never been capable of providing for effective enforcement

of

its

rules or instituting appropriate remedies for

multilateral treaties

its

which have usually been norm

breaches.

Unlike other

setting, states

accede to

bilateral

human

and

rights

instruments either because they think that they incorporate moral values which are
aspirational, or because they realize that

opposed

to

is likely to

"lawmaking"
disappear

Lack of an

rights.

in the contractual sense

when

rights are simply "norm-setting" as

of the term. The acquiescence of

is

the birth defect of almost

and customary rules of international law pertaining

Some

states

the "law" requires positive implementation.

effective tool of implementation

rights instruments

human

human

states

have attempted

to

fill

these lacunae by

enforcement mechanism either unilaterally or multilaterally.

all

human

to the field

of

undertaking an

Economic sanctions have

often been regarded as valuable tools of enforcement to be used against those countries

which

are allegedly

engaged

in the suppression

of human

rights.

This rationale has always created fricdon between states which were " enforcers of

human

rights

norms" and those which were alleged

1

to

be wrongdoers.

Despite the fact

2
that almost all nations

human

of the world have bound themselves

rights obligation, their

As mentioned

enforcement.

view

earlier,

instantly

in

one or another multilateral

change when these obligations involve

most countries do not have an actual

bound by human

rights obligations

and

moral precept,

tentative at best.

Consequently, a defaulting state

defensive

is

when

their acquiescence,

coercive measures for

From

grounds.

human

a practical aspect, they argue that most

development oriented, and an attempt

human

rights does not serve

values on other countries.

its

From

own

human

to coerce states to

any purpose other than

on

political or a

may become

The inadvertence

sanctions.

rights purposes has

rests

norms using one

other states attempt to enforce these

mechanism of enforcement, mainly economic

which

intent to be

to

highly

or the other
to accept

any

practical as well as legal

rights are culture specific or

comply with

certain kinds of

impose one country's

cultural

another angle, they challenge the legal validity of

economic sanctions.
This thesis will attempt to examine the validity of the use of economic sanctions

from the

legal

perspective.

Because some practical questions may be pertinent

examining the legitimacy of economic sanctions for human

in

rights purposes, the paper will

discuss the validity of these measures in light of the existing rules of international law and
the effect of

some

Chapter

II

practical

problems

in using this

discusses the nature and types of economic sanctions. Despite using the

term sanction to denote positive sanctions
the

remedy.

at times, the thesis

employs the normal usage of

meaning of the term, which usually implies negative or coercive measures.

The

third chapter deals with certain legal

problems underlying international human rights law.

and theoretical considerations and

Although there are no generally

3

accepted theoretical

human

foundations for

space

rights,

considerations

preclude a

comprehensive discussion of the complex debates underlying the universality of human

However, the paper

rights.

nor that they

all

The

compliance on a target

norms

human

to

of sanction
rights

examine

and

this vast

is

human

rights are coequal,

relevant to the overall

theme of

is

its

of economic sanction as a mechanism of inducing

legal validity

state will first

and a foremost trigger the question of whether there

comply with or

rights, as are attempts to enforce

validity

This section

all

depicts the problem in the system of enforcement of international

it

rights law.

are universal

not guided by the notion that

deserve equal treatment.

the paper in that

human

is

not.

human

partly conditioned

Views

are divergent

area,

issues of

human

rights at a universal level.

One's view on the

on the issue existence of a

definitive

firm normative basis. Although

and complex

on many

it

which may lead

is

norm of

not the purpose of this paper to

to all kinds

of complexities,

it

will

proceed on the assumption that certain kinds of human rights are natural and are not
subservient to the cultural values of any system.
particular kinds of

in

human

rights

It

will henceforth try to identify those

which are universally accepted and which

most cultures of the world. The paper argues

in favor

are expedient

of the enforcement of these basic

"core" rights on an international level.

The

issue of the legality of

controversial area.

another

measure

is

However, the

economic coercion or

right

its

normative nature

is

a very

of one country to impose economic sanctions on

presented as knowing no limit under international law unless the economic

itself

breached a certain legal obligation without a sound legal justification.

Scholars holding such a viewpoint completely deny the subjection of any economic

measure

to a legality test

by contending

that such a right is inherent in the sovereignty

of

4
states

and by overemphasing the

trading partners.
oversimplified.

many

The

The

right of nations to decide

which nations should be

their

matter, however, cannot be simply stated and should not be

validity of

economic coercive measures

its

own

of

law,

and each example of economic

context.

For instance, economic measures

controversial principles of international

coercion should be examined within

entails the application

enacted to obtain trade benefits in cases in which the donor has no legal obligation to give
or continue to give aid to the donee will pose a different legal ramification of coercion

than those economic threats which are created with respect to legal entitlement, such as
denial of

MFN

treatment under the

former under retorsion since
could be considered
issue

it

is

illegal unless

GATT. Whereas

it

may be

possible to classify the

of lesser significance in international law, the
it

was preceded by an

illegal act.

latter

Consequently, the

of the normative significance of economic coercion will be seen from two

perspectives: either as an act of retortion or an act of reprisal.
First, the legality

of retortive economic sanctions will be the examined. Then, a

discussion follows on the use of economic sanctions as a form of reprisals.

paper will analyze economic sanctions to see
it

will

if

First, this

they constitute the use of force, and if so,

examine the current firm prohibition under

international

law of the use of forcible

countermeasures. In this case scenario, economic sanctions are not generally regarded as
legally justified countermeasures for

of human

whatever purpose they are imposed, including that

rights.

Alternatively, this paper will consider the argument that

non-forcible measures.

economic sanctions

The

gist

of the analysis

rests

economic sanctions

are

on the issue of whether the use of

constitutes a legitimate countermeasure.

In the first part, an attempt

5
will be

made

to see the validity

of economic sanctions

human

pertaining to the enforcement of international

rights

law but

to the

body of

Here again, the issue will be analyzed from two important aspects of

international law.

international

in their generic effects; not directly

law:

(1)

the

international

law

regulating

the

of non-forcible

use

countermeasures and (2) those principles of international law prohibiting the nonintervention

of

states.

Acknowledging

the

fact

economic sanctions generally

that

constitute a legitimate countermeasure (reprisal) if they are taken in response to a

preceding

illegal act, the legality

of economic sanctions will be subjected to conditions

provided under the various principles of international law in this area. The whole scheme

and analysis could and should be transposed and applied

economic sanctions

few of the various

to enforce

human

rights.

The

to analyze the legality

issue of

multilateral legal instruments like the

legality will

GATT

of using

be seen also in

and the Charter of the

Organization of American States.
It

is

worth emphasizing from the outset that contemporary

particular area of international

economic

sanction

is

law does not

totally

in this

support the idea that imposing

a sovereign right of the sanctioning state.

mentioned previously and as will be discussed thoroughly
unilateral

literature

economic sanctions produce a more complex

in the

legal

Nonetheless, as

ensuing sections,

consequence than do

universal sanctions, since the legitimacy of the latter types of sanctions emanates mainly

from international law. Due

to differences in their nature

and universal economic sanctions

and

legal complexity, unilateral

will be discussed separately in this paper.

section will be devoted to analyzing the validity of unilateral

Most of this

economic sanctions. In a

separate chapter, the legitimacy of utilizing collective sanctions will be emphasized.

6
Accordingly, those norms of

and the need

human

for these universal

Nations will be

set forth.

The

rights with a universal character will be identified,

norms

to

be enforced through the system of the United

benefits of collective sanction will also be considered

from

a practical angle.

For the purpose of the paper, the terms countermeasure,
sanction are used interchangeably.

reprisal

and economic

CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN GENERAL

A. Definition of Economic Sanctions
Sanctions generally denote the specific process of law enforcement applied in

response to a breach of a certain norm, which

may

law, with a purpose of inducing compliance.
defined, in very simple terms, as a tool

be established by custom or required by
Similarly,

economic sanction may be

employed by one or many

states to influence the

behavior of another state through the use of economic power as a weapon.

emerge

differences, however,

sanctions,

which may be

definition of

some

definitions based

on the

of economic

effects

either deprivatory or retaliatory in nature. This paper will use the

Makio Miyagawa, which combines both meanings. According

economic sanction

to

Miyagawa,

is:

the use of

'

in

Slight

economic capacity by one

international actor, be

it

a state or

MARGARET P. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT

(1971)Economic sanctions

will be discussed distinctly

from economic welfare which refers

economic coercive measures in time of war as part of the general military effort. The former

remedy

as

opposed

DAOUDI &

to the latter one.

M.S. DAJANI,

is

of

a peacetime

For the discussion of the distinction between the two notions

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE

I

to a situation

,

see M..S

7 (1983).

The words embargoes and boycotts are usually interchangeably used with economic sanctions. This
does not however mean that all three refer to the same situation. Whereas a sanction is a term that
incorporates the notion of both an embargo and a boycott, the meaning of the latter is independent of each
other. Embargo is defined as a prohibition or a restriction of the export of certain goods and services to the
target state

a situation

by one or many concerting states to achieve a particular goal. Boycott on the other hand refers to
where the receiving state refrains from importing goods and services from the target state. For a

detailed discussion

on the differences, see

DAOUDI & DAJANI,

supra, at 8-9.

8
international organization, or

by a group of such

actors, against another

international actor, or group of actors, with the intention of [pjunishing the

breach of a certain rule or preventing

latter for its

it

from infringing the rule

which the party applying the sanction deems important.
the constitutive components of the definition need emphasis. The

Some of

definition, first of

group of

states against another state,

and whose conduct

means by which a

The

states or

which

state

may be compelled

is

a

state,

to

conform

an international organization which

preventive measures.

may

It is

actors under international

Hence, economic sanction

to a certain conduct.

whereas the sanction-imposing entity

definition further denotes that sanctions are

coercion

main

are the

regulated by international law.

is

an economic sanction
group of

notes that economic sanctions can only be imposed by a state or

all,

is

law
a

is

The subject of

may be one

state, a

constituted of sovereign equals.

imposed

to serve as either punitive or

also indicated in the last phrase of the definition that

economic

not necessarily be used to enforce international law but also a tool at the

disposal of states of states to further a country's national policies and interests. Shortly, the

use of sanction, by
to

"interfere

Nevertheless,
prerogatives

the

in

it

its

is

very nature, demonstrates the desire of the sanction-imposing state

decision-making

common

process

of another

foreign

government."

place to mention that economic sanctions are mostly the

of powerful nations, those nations

that

are

the

dominant players

in

international relations.

An
reasons.

^

economic

sanction

may

fail to

achieve

its

For example, the means used by the sanction-imposing

MAKIO MITAGAWA, DO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WORK?
For a similar definition, also see

World

desired goal for any of several

Politics,

J.

Galtung

,

On

state

may

not exert

7 (1992).

the Effects of International

Economic Sanctions,

Vol.XIX, No. 3(1967), P.379.

GARY C.HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:HISTIRORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 6 (2d ed. 1990).
^

'*

See/t/. at 10.

9

enough pressure

to achieve the designated goal.^

commercial trading partners, may be able
the sanction-imposing state.

Or

the target state, by attracting other

to withstand the

economic pressure applied by

In addition, economic sanctions can backfire by triggering

an intense nationalistic reaction, thereby creating a climate of

political integration rather

than one of disintegration in the target state/
B. Types of

Economic Sanctions

Based on the objective

dictates

of situations, the motives accompanying them and

the significance of the breach of the norm, if any, the

may

many

vary from one to

to

almost

all states.

number of sanction-imposing

states

Therefore, sanctions can be categorized

as either unilateral or universal measures.

1.

Universal Economic Sanctions

These kinds of sanctions are imposed by

all

or almost

all

states

through the

instrumentality of global organizations. Their imposition usually follows an action that

is
o

considered to be a blatant violation of international law by the international community.

The adoption of such

a measure

is at

once a manifestation of

crossed the boundary of international conduct and

^

how much

how

far the target state

the international

has

community

Id. at \2.

'id
7

TTie failure or marginal

outcome of some economic sanctions has been

reaction triggered by the measures.

aggression

in

Ethiopia

in

The

largely attributed to nationalistic

ineffectiveness of the League's sanction against Italy for

1935-1936, Soviet sanction against Yugoslavia between 1948-1955,

its

US

economic pressure against Indonesia in 1963-66, and US sanction against Nicaragua in the 1980s was
mainly attributed to this factor. See Id.at 12-13, (discussing the limitations on the use of sanctions.)
The economic sanction of the League against Italy did not make Italy change its mind about its aggression
against Ethiopia; also, the Arab Oil embargo, which followed the US supply of arms to Israel during the
Yom Kippur war, did not force the US to refrain from doing so, even though the measure resulted in
domestic political tension. Neither the Soviet Union's economic sanction against Yugoslavia for
solidarity with the Socialist

camp, nor

that

MITAGAWA, supra note 2, at 206-207.
LONERBERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

national interest, brought about a significant outcome. See
^

WILLIAM

H.

KAEMPFER & ANTON

its

loose

of US against Cuba, which was triggered by the pursuit of its

D.

SANCTIONS: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE,

16 (1992).

10
is

displeased with the target's behavior.

The use of universal economic sanctions
of Nations.

The emergence of

dates back to the creation of the League

League of Nations marked the creation of an

the

"international system of guarantee and punishment" for the first time in the history of
international relations.

enforcement and with

The Covenant of

Its

establishment heralded the possibility of using international

emerged the idea of using sanctions

it

which came

the League,

mechanism through

collective sanctioning.

member

taking of a measure against a

if

into existence in

Article

it

in a global perspective.^

XXI

resorted to

1916, devised a security

of the Covenant provided for the

war

Although the word "sanction" was not expressly used

,

in breach of the Covenant.

the

Covenant mandated the

imposition of economic measures as follows:

Member
all

states

were

to subject the

law-breaking nation to the severance of

trade and financial relations, the prohibition of

and the nationals of the covenant-breaking

prevention of

all

financial,
it

of the former to achieve

United Nations

is

the

DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra notel,

'%^.
'
'

See

at

12

not.

purpose of maintaining world order.

its

and the

the United Nations, mainly due to the

organization with the

global

state,

commercial or personal intercourse of any

was a member of the League or

The League of Nations was replaced by

^

intercourse between

their nationals

Other state, whether

failure

all

At present, the

power of imposing mandatory

at 56.

56.

DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note

1,

at

Sl{citmg E.P. Walters,

A

History of the League).

''id.

The League of Nations applied
its

act of aggression against Ethiopia in

this

device of collective security for the

November

first

time against Italy for

1935. This economic sanction included an

embargo on

the shipment of arms, the prohibition of loans and the extension of credit, an interdict on imports from the

offending country and exports of many manufactured goods and raw materials needed to carry on the war.

DAOUDI & DAJANI,

supra note

I, at

63 {citing Anderson, Modern Europe

in

World Perspective,

at

479)

11

economic sanctions through the Security Council. ^^

Rhodesia was the

experience a United Nations sanction.'"^ This sanction was blessed by

first

many

country to

as a

landmark

decision heralding the use of collective enforcement measures of the Security Council

under

article

One observer remarked, "The

4 1 of the Charter.

unprecedented, never having been used before.

mandator}' sanctions are

Great powers had, for the

only agreed to accept sanctions but have pushed to get them adopted.

however weak

this first step, are

One disadvantage of
effective implementation

to

is

more

implications,

evident: the lack of

the evasion of responsibilities by

Although certain resolutions of the Security Council derive
of the United Nations and, in principle

at least, states

their legality

member

states.

from the Charter

have agreed to comply with

decisions, the effective implementation of these decisions depends

commitment of each member

The

time, not

momentous."'^

universal economic sanction

due

first

on the

its

and

attitude

state.

After deciding on the existence of the breach or threat to the peace, the Security Council can impose

economic sanction as an enforcement action under article 41 of the Charter. Article 41 reads thus: "The
Security Council can decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to
give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such
measures. These
14

The

British

may

include complete or partial interruption of economic relations."

government agreed

to grant

democracy ruled by the black majority, but

independence to Rhodesia on the condition that

was circumvented when

this plan

it

would be

the white minority led

a

by

Prime Minister Ian Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence from the British Empire. The
unilateral declaration

was challenged
'^

was held

to be illegal

as being without

DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra

any
I

,

by the international community and the authority of Ian Smith

at

DAOUDI AND DAJANI, supra note 1, at 77-82.
MESERIK, RHODESIA AND THE UNITED

See

legal validity.

80 {citing A.G.

NATIONS).
The motive

for evading a universal sanction can be attributed for three reasons: political

symphaty, cost

of effective compliance and greed. See Douglas G. Anglin, United Nations and International Economic
Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia,

SANCTIONS,
Albeit

38-39
its

THE UTILITY OF fNTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ed.,

1987)

universal character, the execution of universal sanctions falls totally in the hands of the

national systems, which

may

subject

Rhodesia for instance. United States

Amendment, which
like Portugal

in

(DAVID LEYTON-BROWN,

lifted the

it

to a certain

after initial

embargo

and South Africa defied

danger of evasion. During the U.N. sanction against

compliance with the sanction, adopted the Byrd

against the importation of Rhodesia's chrome. Moreover, countries

their obligations for

'"''^~™'''^''''"'''^^

one or another

political,

economic or

12

Be

this as

may, universal economic sanctions are desirable both

legitimacy and the relative attainment of the intended result.

framework imposing these sanctions, the number of

The

in

terms of their

validity

of the legal

states taking active part in their

implementation, and the apparent nature of the breach of international law

is critical

in

determining the legitimacy and relative effectiveness of sanctions.'^ The implementation

of a universal decision

more

difficult to

values. Also, in

of a target

2.

state

Unilateral

that utilizes

economic sanctions against a designated country

achieve in the face of diverse interest of states and opposing views and

some

and

cases a government

will not

want

may

to increase

its

feel responsible for the

risks

and

domestic interests

costs.

Economic Sanctions

These are sanctions undertaken by a single or a group of
"unilateral" numerically refers to a single entity, the paper

ideological reason.

Had

would not have had
In the

is

it

states.

Although

assumes that multilateral

not been for such defiance by the sanction violators, the Rhodesian government

a prolonged

life. Id. at

38-39.

1966 mandatory sanction against Rhodesia, a mechanism was devised through which the

make a regular report on the implementation. In May 1968,
was formed to ensure the implementation of the comprehensive
sanction subsequently imposed, this Committee was authorized to examine the reports of the Secretariat,
seek information on the implementation of the sanction from members and some other alleged sanction
breaking members. This committee had some difficulties in obtaining the information it sought from the
member states; some governments failed to respond to the requests; some delayed or sent a complicated or
Secretary General of the United Nations would

a security Council sanction committee

apathetic replies. This

made

the task of the committee unexpectedly hard.

MARGARET DOXEY,

INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

107-108 (1987).
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M.Jenneffer Mackay, Economic Sanctions: Are they Actually Enforcing International Law In SerbiaMonte Negro, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 208 (1995).
The efficacy of economic sanctions in causing the intended economic leverage may depend on the
comprehensiveness of the sanction and the number of nations participating. The higher the number of
participating nations, the lesser the chance of obtaining an alternative import and export market to the
target state.

Consequently, non-compliance of an international

circumvent the effectiveness of economic sanctions. See

call for sanctions against the target

LOWENBERG, INTERNATIONAL SANCTION PERSPECTIVE
'^

DOXEY,

Supra note

16, at 90.

may

WILLIAM H.KAEMFER AND ANTONY D.
65(1992).
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sanctions are essentially unilateral because they are imposed by a group of countries

common

sharing

values and perceptions and narrow interests.

say that this kind of sanction

is

the prerogative of big powers,

capability of manipulating situations to their

own

It is

which

a

common

retain the

place to

economic

national interests. Unilateral sanctions

have been deployed in pursuit of a number of national

and foreign goals and

interest

motives.
Unilateral sanctions have also been deployed as coercive instruments to achieve

more modest purposes, such

as helping to promote

claims and discouraging terrorism.
player,

acting as a "guardian of

economic pressure

human

rights, settling expropriation

Here, too, the United States has been the leading
its

to help influence the

own

version of global morality,"

human

rights situations in Haiti,

employing

Burma, Somalia

and the Sudan.

Unilateral

sanctions are also utilized by states either in groups or through

multilateral organizations for a multitude of purposes.

which may also be called

common

accomplish a

multilateral

sanctions,

Organized unilateral sanctions,

have been deployed

Efforts to destabilize

most countries

US

Cuba has

On

and the Brazilian dictator

the contrary, the three decade comprehensive sanction of the United States

not yet achieved

its

Similarly, the former Soviet

hegemony during

to

unilateral sanctions contributed fairly

significantly to the overthrow of the Chilean President Salvador Allende in 1973,

against

allied or

governments were used during the cold war era when the superpowers sought

bring other nations under their ideological sphere of influences.

Jaol Goularin in 1964.

order to

During the cold war, which was characterized by a bipolar

goal.

ideological conflict between the East and the West, for example,

19

in

the cold world war.

intended result.

Id. at 5-7.

Union had deployed an economic leverage

One

to maintain her

illustration to this effect is the infliction

of economic sanction of

the Soviet union against Yugoslavia in 1948 for the latter's defection from the former's sphere of influence

which was perceived by the former as a
supranoXe
20

1, at

threat to regional stability

and

security.

See

DAOUDI & DAJANI,

123-24.

HUFBAUER ET AL.,

supra note

3, at 6.

£i^BS^^^^SES^^3^H
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identified themselves with this or that ideological bloc,

and each bloc attempted

to restrict

the free trade of the other.

The boycott of Iranian

1951-1953, was a typical example of the joint response

oil,

by the Western Bloc

to the nationalization

government, as led by

Mohammed Mossadeq

74 on the developed world
multiple states.

coercion
in

is

is

of the

Iran's oil

in 1951.^^

industry by the Iranian

The Arab

oil

embargo of 1973-

another example of the sanction by a concerted effort of

This embargo

is

an exception to the general practice that economic

a tool only at the disposal of developed western nations.

which the Iranian government seized the

US embassy

in

In another episode,

Teheran and took hostages of

52 diplomatic personnel, members of the European Community and other industrialized
countries cooperated with the United States by restricting their trade with Iran to a certain
extent.

Unilateral

economic sanctions

The Organization of American

organizations.

examples of regional organizations

^'

22

DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note

1, at

that apply

The Arab

fall

oil

of the government. See

States

by multilateral or regional

and the European Union are

economic coercion.

"

In such unilateral

91-92.

This embargo boycotted the importation of Iranian

cause for the
23

are also sponsored

oil

by the West and eventually became the major

Id. at 95.

producing countries controlled the production and exportation of oil to the developed

countries so as to coerce them use their influence on Israel to evacuate territories which

during the 1967 war. Id
^"^

DOXEY,

supra note

at

one instance involving

acts

of aggression

in

Venezuela, and the attempted assassination of

president by the Trujillo regime of the Dominican government, the

OAS

unanimous resolution

relations.

OAS

had occupied

16, at 33.

25
In

it

104-105.

calling for a partial interruption of

economic

first

its

adopted, in August 1960, a
Later, in January 1961, the

extended the embargo to include important commodities such as petroleum. In another episode

1962, the

member

states

of the

OAS

decided to discontinue trade with Cuba because of

its

in

express

ijjiiiiLi iiii

aft—aa^HiM^
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sanctions involving groups of states sharing a

common

value, there

is

a higher possibility

of procuring a commonality of shared values and perceptions than
universal sanctions.

is

prevalent in

Consequently, they are more likely to be implemented than are

universal sanctions. 27

C.

Means

of Economic Sanctions

Under

the

implementation.

heading of economic sanctions are included certain methods of

These could generally be grouped into the following categories: trade

sanctions, financial sanctions

1.

and development aid sanctions.

Trade Sanctions

Trade embargoes presuppose a restriction
exports.

The

sanction, be

regulations of imports and exports

it

in the

is

a

flow of goods, both imports and

method of

through a unilateral or a universal sanction. The trade embargo

the form of an active embargo, in

which the sanction- imposing

blocks the imports of goods and services from the target

embargo may be passive, an embargo
exporting

its

goods and services

in

communist ideology.

economic

may

take

state actively refuses or

Similarly, the trade

state.

which the sanction-imposing

state abstains

from

28

to the target state.

Whereas export controls have an impact on

allegiance to the

affecting an

the target's

economy

in a direct

Id. at 60.

^^/^. at90.

27 For example, see
28

DAOUDI & DAJANI,

Passive embargoes are also

known

as

supra note

1,

at 167.

See also

have been described as import embargoes or economic blockades. See C.

MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS

IN

id. at

143.

economic boycotts or export embargoes while active embargoes

INTERNATIONAL LAW

LLOYD BROWN- JOHN,

19 (1975).

16

manner, import controls do so

in

an indirect manner.'^^

Import controls are generally

easier for the imposing state to apply; however, complexities surrounding the assessment

may make

of the value-added content of goods

The

may

target country

determination of the goods difficult.^°

attempt to penetrate the market of the sanction-imposing state

through a triangular purchase arrangement.^' Complications arise

which the sanction-imposing

sent through a third state,

state

when

these goods are

has no power to control,

unless the third state allows an extra-territorial application of the foreign law of the

sanction-imposmg
in unilateral

imposing

2.

29

m

state

its

These problems are more apparent

domestic jurisdiction.

economic sanctions than

in universal ones, since the

of using third

states reduces the likelihood

number of the

sanction-

states.

Financial Sanctions

While export embargoes deprive the target of needed commodities, import embargoes deprive the target

of the resources to finance the importation of these products. They attack the
the international market. Export restrictions without import

capacity of the target, allowing

embargoes

are

more

MIYAGAWA, 5wpra note 2,

at

If a unilateral sanction

may

goods

to obtain the

that

it

purchase

economic leverage on the

target.

See generally

is

imposed, the target
alternative

may

be able to substitute goods that are banned by

market for the supply of the goods

at a slightly

higher price.

not be possible, however, because the impact on the existing trade relationship between the target

and the sanction-imposing state is particularly effective during the pre-sanction era. The tighter the
economic link is between the target and the sanction-enforcing state, the greater the impact on the target.
the target

is

compelled

cut off from

to offer a

its

potentially extensive export market, exporters in the target state

lower price to customers

major exporting country, target importers are
an alternative market.

See generally

in the

may

in their trade laws,

HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3,
The

issue of transshipment of

Transshipment
state.

See

is

a process in

MIYAGAWA,

In cases

it is

state.

at 36.

BROWN-JOHN,

See also

there

which the goods of one
1,

at

is

an import ban from a

its

7, at 66.

goods, except to

ssupra note

BROWN- JOHN,

make

sure that

at 28.
1,

at

situation in applying trade

state are transferred to

61-64. Also, see

1

a practical problem for the

supra note 27,

MIYAGAWA,

goods poses a complicated

ssupra note

if

of export embargoes (passive embargoes), the

not be able to control the destination of

they are not shipped directly to the target
^'

market. Similarly,

If

may be

encounter higher prices as they attempt to buy from

KAEMPFER &LOWENBERG, supra note

enforcing state to verify the origin of commodities.

sanction-imposing state

new

likely to

Although many countries have rules of origin

32

in

16-18.

embargoes and find an

the export

This

it

effective because they exert a heavier

target's abiHty to

embargoes may preserve the purchasing
needs from other sources. Thus, import

61-64.

embargoes.

another via a third or fourth

supra note 28,

at

21-24.
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A healthy and growing
forms of
bilateral

is

credit,

economy must

exchange reserves,

acquire foreign development capital in the

facilities for the sale

and multilateral financial assistance.

one form of economic sanction.

arrangement with the

market and

ft^eezing

influence the target.

such as the

IMF and

Hence, denial of access

Refusing to grant a previously arranged credit

assets are

some of

capital

money

the techniques of maneuvering finance to

The

freezing of assets and influence through financial institutions

the

World Bank has been

particularly effective.

sanction works on the assumption that a target state
"foreign

to foreign capital

blocking an acquisition loan on the international

target,

bank

of bonds, a growing trade, and

sources

This type of

would gradually collapse

if its

were controlled and international exchange sources were

exhausted."

3.

Sanctions Through the Use of Development Assistance

Foreign aid

is

a very powerful

against the third world.^^

The

weapon

at the disposal

of the developed world

efficacy and the destabilizing effect of this kind of sanction

depends on whether the development aid deprived or provided to the target

"
^^

See

BROWN-JOHN,

supra note 28,

at

state is

28.

HUFBAUER ET AL, supra note 3, at 28.

''id.

The

known

act of giving

development aid

as a positive sanction since

it

to stimulate
is

compliance to the demands of the donating

motivational

in

purpose.

.

state

Similarly, the act of withholding aid

the sanctioning state for actions by the target that the donor considers to be unlawful or unpleasant

known

as a negative sanction.

See

MIYAGAWA, supra note,

is

at 28.

is

by

a

18
substantial contribution to

its

economy.

Foreign aid has been applied for a

variet}'

of reasons, the motives varying from a

purely political motive, to a technique of law enforcement, to an altruistic motive.

development programs have emerged as an important part of the foreign policies

Official

of most developed nations, although the motives behind
and

radically.

The underlying motivation may involve

humanitarian attitudes or diplomatic or political gains.
foreign aid

was used

means of

norm

international

instances,

and

During the cold war period,

to attract neutrals

and adversaries.

states

of the West to keep

38

In other instances,

or agreement such as an unlawful expropriation.
for a humanitarian purpose-to

encourage democratic values

As might be

it

retaliation or reprisal against the target state for its breach

was applied

it

37

have varied widely

the donor nation's security,

by the economically powerful

effectively

their ideological allies

utilized as a

their policies

was

of an

39

In

promote human

still

rights

other

and

to

in the target state.

expected, developing countries do not

welcome

the intrusion of

performance conditioning or the conditioning of aid on the performance of human rights

^^

C. FRED BERGSTEN & LAWRENCE
ECONOMICS 140-141 (1975).
38

B.

KRAUSE,

For instance, the United States has used aid for

diplomatic

initiative, to

change a government's

POLICY 224
39

This

is

strengthen or
internal

weaken

and foreign

many

WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL

purposes: to solicit support for a particular

a particular government's internal political position

policies.

THOMAS

L.

and to

BREWER, AMERICAN FOREIGN

(1980).

a self-remedy which

is

allowed to force defaulting

states into

compliance, since

it

is

carried out

These measures were imposed on aid recipients that expropriated
in
penalize third world countries like India or Egypt that pursued a
were
also
used
to
and
American property
affairs.
This remedy was also used against the Philippines, which
international
non- alignment policy in
the course of exercising a legal

voted

in

right.

constant opposition of the

US

position in the General

Assembly of the United Nations. See

Id. at

128.

The United
of human

States for

rights.

See

example withdrew aid for countries sue

HUFBAUER, supra note

3, at

as Chile,

Guatemala and

Haiti

on grounds

359, 417, 438, 598.

Moreover, multilateral instruments such as the Lome Convention upholds the viewpoint that the promotion
of human rights should be an integral part of development and the assistance of the European Union goes
to those states pursuing that objective. See Fourth ACP-EEC Convention and Final Act, Dec. 15, 1989.

19
practices.

The use of

this

weapon

for

human

rights purpose is

opposed by a number of

countries on the basis of the varying theoretical, legal and political reasons.
issue in a legal perspective,

it is

uman

put the

important to discuss on the nature and normative status

and issue of universality of human

A

To

rights.

brief analysis of the controversy surrounding te issues of the universality of

rigts

and

their

normative character

using sanctions to enforce

human

rights

may

help one to comprehend the importance of

and the need for the importance of this notion.

CHAPTER III

AN OVERVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Sources of International

Law

The notion of human

of Human Rights.

and international

rights is subject to both national

legal

regimes, the former being manifested under the constitutional law in the domestic legal

system while the

latter

exists

Nonetheless, most states

fail to

regimes protecting
spite

of the

human

in

a

form of international

comply with both the national and

fact that they

have "voluntarily consented

even more complicated

human

rights.

to

disputes

among

states

in the international legal

affairs-mainly to

commitments

The

on issues of human

rights is

be bound by international

The conceptual

basis of

paradigm. States

could be an international legal regime dealing with

if there

international legal

rights. Particularly in the international legal order, states fail in

obligations regulating certain standards of
rights gets

and customs.

treaties

human

rights.

fail to

fail

to

agree

The various

symbolic in displaying such

present a positive public image-most states

human

state

of

uphold these

in practice.

basic source of law in the international paradigm

Nations, and the greater part of international

of multilateral human

right instruments.

human

rights

is

law

the Charter of the United

is

The United Nations grew

20

contained in a number
as a central

forum

for

21

development of international

the

human

rights

multilateral treaties regulating a vast area of

law,

human

and

it

rights.

"*'

The vaguely worded

provisos of human rights were further elaborated by subsequent international
instruments such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of

Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights'*^

Human

numerous

sponsored

human

right

Rights: the International

and the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights'^l

B.

The Controversy Surrounding

the

Theory of Human Rights:

Universalism Versus Cultural Relativism

The

issue of the universality of human rights

divided positions. In one category are scholars
are

This

universal.

universalist

jurisprudential schools of thought,

positivist

41

position,

who propound

in

namely the

may be examined from two

turn,

positivist

human

the idea that

two

rights

in

divided

and

naturalist approaches.'*''

into

different

The

approach emphasizes the normative binding nature of rules created by the

The United Nations Human Rights Commission was mandated

rights,

critically

which was adopted

in

in

1946 to prepare an international

of

bill

1948 by the General Assembly as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed 10 Dec. 1948,

GA

Res. 217 A(III),

UN

Dec. A/810,

at

71 (1948).

The scope of human

rights in the

UN

Charter

is

broader and multidimensional

endorsed multitude of civil, economic and social and cultural
that all necessary

by other fellow

measures be taken

citizens. Social

that states "take the

to protect the infringement

Asbjom

civil

and

in nature. It

political rights requires

of the rights of individuals bythe

measures necessary to ensure for each person within

personal effoerts". See

HUMAN

The

and economic rights which are also called the obligation to

obtain satisfaction of those needs, recognized in the

Rights, in
42
International

rights.

human

Eide, National sovereignty

RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE

Covenant on Civil and

5 (Eide

Political Rights,

&

its

state or

fulfill,

require

jurisdiction opportunities to

rights instruments,

which cannot be secured by

and international Efforts

to Realize

Human

Hagtuet, eds., 1992)

adopted 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 Mar.

1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171(1966)
43

International

Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 21 Dec. 1965, entered

force 4 Jan. 1969,

660 U.N.T.S.(1966). See generally

SCOTT DAVIDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS

into

64-

67(1993)
44

Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights,

RIGHTS

IN

PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 44-45

in

HUMAN

(Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, ed. 1992).
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various

human

international

committed themselves.

rights

States

instruments,

were directly involved

Naturalists on the other

being basically laid

emergence of

this

down

concept

rights

and

have

states

and subsequent

their

machinery of

hand view the content of human

in perpetual values

is

which individual
in the formulation

human

adoption of these international standards of
implementation.

to

rights as

having a universal existence, and the

attributed to the transformation of

modem human

thought

about the nature of justice.

An

opposite position to the two universalist approaches described above

who

the cultural relativists,

the

West and does not have a

developing nations.

48

is

tenet of relativism in

right or

wrong.

rights vary according to the culture

reflection of local

of

rights is recognized only in

human

moral standards have no force or validity

given conduct of a state

human

human

that

legitimate status in the major cultural traditions of

The underlying

transterritorial, legal or

"^

hold that the concept of

is

rights practices is that

in

judging whether a

These scholars contend
of individual

states

of

and are necessarily a

They attempt

and domestic "idiosyncracies".

that standards

to substantiate this

IdAA.

''id
44-45.

"^^Z^. at

The adherents of this view generally advocate
rationalizing that western civilization has
in the past
"^^

49

Id

that

human

rights

is

not the culture of the west by

committed the most barbaric violations on mankind

and, moreover, has been very slow in adopting the concepts of

human

rights. Id.

in the

At

world

45.

at 45.

See Abdullahi A. An'im, Towards A Cross-Cultural Approach To Defining International Standards of

Human Rights The Meaning Of Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS 41 (Abdullahi A. An:

Na'im,

ed. 1992).

Falk, supra note 44, at 45.

For instance, Abdullahi An-Na'im analyzes the condemnation of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment
order to illustrate the need for a cross-cultural approach to defining the concept and the difficulty of

implementing the same. He says

that

it

is

unrealistic to expect a

standards. For example, he notes that a North American

may

uniform application or interpretation of

conceive a short term imprisonment to be an

in

23
contention by comparing the lawfulness of a given conduct in two or

more

cultures;

considered to be a violation of human rights in the West could be a proper

is

as well as legally, in another culture.

there exists a

norms

rights

They

and philosophical basis and these foundations, as

concerned, are attributed
are the

initially to

main protagonists of this

the philosophical

western culture.

idea, say that they

hegemony of the West by

52

Moslem may

appropriate sanction for theft, while a
similar condition.

The American would have

The

rights

is

a

have a certain

human

as

far

rights

its

are

world countries, which

third

articulating their

own

to resist

indigenous ideas and

impact of circumscribing the

practical values.

feel that

amputation of the hand

a feeling that Islamic punishment

inhumane and such should not be the norm. A Moslem may think
due to such differences, it is not easy
particular area. See An-na'im, supra note 48, at 37-38.
ethnocentricity. Apparently,

at

as there

have not been strong enough

concepts. These countries point to colonization and

development of their basic philosophical and

they

allege that, like any other normative

and principles, the current international standards of human

cultural

/c/.

at the international level,

meaning and application cannot be uniform and standard,

substantial variation in different cultures.^'

rules

morally

Alternatively, although the culturalists admit that

body of substantive human

insist that their

act,

what

that this

is

view

is

is

appropriate under a

'obviously' cruel and
a reflection of western

to establish a universal standard in a

20-21.

''id.
Yet, the thinking prevalent in

many of those developing countries-countries that have not recognized the
own notions-is gradually devolving to a conditional

universality of human rights and claim to have their

acceptance of individual
the

Vienna Conference

cautioned that

human

rights.

in

In the

Human

rights

1993 Bangkok Declaration, Asian countries revised their stand for

Rights; these governments affirmed the universality of human rights but

"must be considered

international norm-setting, bearing in

mind

in the

context of a dynamic and evolving process of

the significance of national and regional particularities and the

various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds". See Preparatory meeting of the Asian countries in

Bangkok, March 1993, Far
Similarly, the

legal

E.

Econ. Rev. 16 (June 17, 1993).

framework

and People Rights, a document

for

that

human

rights in Africa

gave due weightage

is

contained

in the

African Charter on

to individual rights. Nevertheless, the

the Charter expressly stated that "the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights
the enjoyment of civil and political rights".
53

An-na'im, supra note 49,at 22, at39.

OAU Doc. CAB/ LEG/67/3/ Rev.

5 (1982),

is

Human

Preamble of

a guarantee for

PMBL.,

Par. 8.
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Most
over

human

scholars in this area hold polar positions on the relevance of cultural values

rights, but

both views have their

own

strong arguement.

a careful inquir\' in examining the relevance of cultures.

derives

its

One has

The view

practical reality.

One need only

to realize the disparity

standards and the cultural values of

important to note the argument,

some developing

made by

human

rights

falls short

of the

that

legitimacy from the diverse cultural traditions of the world

pause for

to

between certain human

countries.

On

the other hand,

right

it

is

the universalist group, that the purpose of

cultural relativism is only an excuse for justifying

human

rights violations

under the

pretext of preserving cultural traditions.

C.

The

Classification of Rights

under International

In the previous discussion,

different

approach

we

Law

noted that different regions of the world hold

views about the validity or relevance of human
is

rights.

Undoubtedly,

reflected in practice, for the difference in the understanding about the

existence, significance and relationships of these rights gives birth to

consequence.

of human

this

Thus, a considerable debate

rights.

The most important ones

groups of human rights and

te

surrounding the universality of
kinds of human rights into

many

still

its

own

practical

revolves around the definition and scope

relate to te relationsip

between the different

degree of importance between the same. The argument

human

rights is evident in the classification

of different

categories and in the issue of primacy of one category of

rights over another.

There exists an enormous controversy surrounding the juridical nature and the
normative relationship between the so-called generations of

rights.

One

position takes

.

25
the extreme

view

and

that only civil

political rights,

generation rights, should be recognized as

According

human

which

are also

known

first

^"^

rights

the juridical

in

second and third generation rights are not rights

to this position,

as

sense.

in the strict

sense in that they cannot be claimed as rights and are only inspirational targets that do not
create a normative obligation.

"

An

opposite view to this argument, on the other hand,

holds that economic and social rights should attain primacy because the realization of the
generation of rights

first

somehow dependent upon

is

the second and third generation rights."

more

some

significance to

the realization and the fulfillment of

Consequently, the developing world attaches

categories of rights than does the developed world.^^

Banjul Charter, for instance, contains provisions on

civil

and

The

political rights, as well as

provisions on social and economic rights, but the Charter underlines that the enhancement

of economic, social and cultural rights are the "guarantee for the enjoyment of

civil

and

'^4

For example, Jerome Shestack observes that
over social and economic

rights,

because the

civil

and

latter are

former can be secured by an act of simple omission. See

JURISPRUDENCE OF

HUMAN

RIGTS,

in

Human

political rights

JEROME J. SHESTACK, THE

Rigts in International

BoV en. Distinguishing Criterias for Human
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (IVasak,

ed., 1984).

See also T. Van

Falk, supra note 44, at

"deserve a hierarchical preference"

"contingent claims or expectations', while the

Law 73

Rights

,

in

(1

Theodore Meron,

THE

ed., 1982).

45-46.

This controversy was manifested

in the

process of producing a legally binding instrument fi-om the

principles upheld in the Universal Declaration of

Human

Rights. In the formulation of the binding

document, one group advocated the adoption of all kinds of rights as legally binding, holding
types of rights constituted an indivisible and mutually self-supporting whole".
led

by the United States and the United Kingdom propounded

On

that international

that "all

the other hand, a group

law could protect only

first

generation rights as a matter of immediacy.

This dichotomy resulted

in the

emergence of two separate

legal instruments dealing with

two

generations of rights, both adopting different methods of implementation. The International Convention on
Civil

and

within

its

Political Rights

territory

under

and subject

article 2(1) calls for

to

its

member

states to "respect

jurisdiction the rights recognized

".

and ensure to

all

individuals

Article 2(1) of the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights demands that states "undertake to take steps. ..to the
maximum of their available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the ftill realization of the
right recognized".

See generally Van Boven, supra note 54,

at

41

26
CO

political rights"

thus indicating the primacy of the former group of rights over the

,

latter.

The

category

third

is

a

makes a

generation of rights has a normative existence but

among

approach.

middle-of-the-raod

hierarchical classification

some

various categories of rights by advocating that

the

fundamental than others.

admits that each

It

rights

These so-called fundamental rights are referred

more

are

to as "supra

or "elementary rights" because their validity "is not dependent on their

positive"

acceptance by the subjects of the law but [these rights, collectively] are the foundations of

community".

the international

inviolable

and

non-derogatory,

Certain kinds of rights have been asserted to be

having

the

of a jus

characteristics

The

cogens.

characterization of certain rights as non-derogatory and their status as "peremptory

norms"

are,

as the

argument runs, "binding on

states,

even

absence of any

in the

conventional obligation or any other express acceptance or comment".

These core
instruments.

have been incorporated

rights

The Charter of

in universal

and regional human rights

the United Nations, for instance, refers to

some

rights as

being fundamental. The Preamble of the Charter clearly mentions that the peoples of the

United Nations are determined "to reaffirm faith in fundamental

human

This

rights."

implies that certain rights acquire a higher status by being fundamental and by having a

<0

OAU
59

A

Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ Rev. 5 (1987).

Van
A Peremptory

Boven, supra note 54,

treaty

is

void

norm

if,

at

is

at

43-44.

defined under article of the Vienna La

the time of

its

conclusion,

it

w

conflicts with a

law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory

of Treaties

in the

following manner:

peremptory norm of general international

norm of general

international law

is

a

norm

accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation

is

permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent

having the same character. Vienna convention on the
61

Van Boven, supra

" See

note 54,

at

U.N. Charter, pmbl.

43.

norm of general

Law of Treaties, May

28, 1969,

1

international law

155 U.N.T.S.331.
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prior existence to their recognition under the Charter.^^ These rights are critical to the

preservation of
state abstain

human

life,

and

their

enhancement and promotion requires only

from the interference of these

rights.^"*

The prohibition against

that the

acts of

genocide, racial discrimination, extra-judicial killing, torture, inhumane and degrading
treatment, slavery and unlawful or prolonged detention are

where no derogation
of

rights,

it

is

genocode, slavery,

See

allowed.

apparent that

The paper advocates

"

is

many

nations attach special importance to these core rights.

the universal enforcement of these kind of

torture,

SHESTACK, Supra note

These fundamental

^^

human

rights such as

enfoced disappearance, racial discrimination, apartheid,

etc.

54, at 73..

rights could be distinguished

from other human

by the "subjects of law" but are considered
international community. See Van Boven, supra note 54, at 58.
on

rights

Despite the varying views that surround the generation

64
rest

some examples of core

their acceptance

to

rights in that their validity does not

be

at the

foundation of the

/^.at 44-48.

The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United

States

lists

the following acts as prohibitions

of customary international law: genocide; slavery and slave trade; murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals; torture or other cruel,

inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged

arbitrary

detention; systematic racial discrimination; and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally

recognized rights. See

RESTATEMENT (Third) OF FOREGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES, Sec.702( 1987).

CHAPTER IV
THE ISSUE OF THE LEGALITY OF USING
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Economic Sanctions as a Forcible Countermeasures:
Forcible Countermeasures

Contemporary

Under

international

The General Prohibition of

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

law precluded the use of force as a form of

The United Nations Charter expressly proscribes the use of force except

As Bowett

reprisal.

in self-defense.

charter, the use

of force by way of reprisal

attempt to resolve the legality of economic

coercion as a means of

noted,

"Under the United Nations

is illegal."

Any

countermeasure
Charter.

whether

rests

on the meaning one gives

Whether or not
it

this provision applies exclusively to the

it

use of armed force

or

vague, either with purpose or inadvertantly. The scope of

Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse

to

Armed Force, 66 AM.

prohibition of the threat or use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter

principles governing the United Nations and
shall refrain in their international relation
political

of force" under the

can also be applied to economic coercion-is open to interpretation. The

architects of the Charter left

The

to the phrase "use

independence of any

state,

its

J.

is

Int'L. L.

1,

1

(1972).

one of the fundamental

members. Article 2(4) reads as follows: "All members

from the threat or use of force against the

or in any other

manner

Nations".

28

territorial integrity

inconsistent with the purpose of the United

of

29
this prohibition

legality

has remained debatable and interpretative. The question of resolving the

of economic coercion under the Charter of the United Nations

meaning of the phrase "use of force" under
thought.

One

article 2(4).

rests

on

There are two schools of

school advocates a wider interpretation in the meaning of the phrase so as

to include

economic coercion. Kelsen understood the prohibition of force

action of a

member

another state."

State illegal under general international

As one of

the leading authors

who

law which

is

to

mean "any

directed against

held that the prohibition of force

transcended physical force, Kelsen further maintained,

A

the

distinction

between armed force and other kind of force necessarily

follows from the provision of article 39, 41, 42 and 50, concerning the

measure

to

be taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of

international peace

and

security.

According

to the provisions

of

article 41

and 42, two kinds of measures are to be distinguished, and according
article 50,

to

both are to be considered as "enforcement measures": a measure

"not involving the use of armed force" /Art. 41/ and a measure "involving

armed force" /Art. 42/. If there are "enforcement" measures
involving the use of armed force and "enforcement" measures not
involving the use of armed force, armed force that is force exercised by the
use of arms must be distinguished from force exercised in another way,
that is force not exercised by the use or arms. There are two kinds of force
not exercised by the use of arms: (1) an action of a state directed against a
state which constitutes a violation of international law, but which does not
involve the use of arms; (2) a reprisal which does not involve the use of
the use of

armed

force.

Article 2, paragraph 4, refers to the "use of force."

It

therefore prohibits both kinds of force.

HANS KELSEN, INTERNATRIONAL LAW STUDIES: COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 57(VOL. 49, 1957).
^^
HANS KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, 49
USNWCILS(1957). Also see BELACHEW ASRAT, PROHIBITION OF FORCE UNDER THE UN
CHARTER: A STUDY OF ART. 2(4) 16 (199 1).
^^

1

30

A similar interpretation was

set forth

by McDougal and Feliciano, who contended

that the attitude that the:

employment of non-military types of coercion was never meant to be
is subject to serious reservations. The authority of the Security

prohibited,

Council to characterize particular coercion as a "threat to the peace,"
"breach of the peace" or "act of aggression", and to
sanctioning measures

is

modality of coercion that

may be

the

West.

In

appropriate

so characterized.^^

This school grew in influence, especially in the
against

call for

not restricted, by the charter at least, as to the

contemporary

state

oil

boycott of the Arab states

of international

however, the

affairs,

developing countries, which seek legal protection from interference by powerful
are the chief adherents of this viewpoint.

They contend

that non-military

should be included in the general proscription of use of force, many,

^^

MYRE S

S.

MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.

PUBLIC ORDER

FELICIANO,

states,

forms of duress

if

not

all,

of the

LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD

1-12(1961).

1

Paust &Blaustein, The Arab oil weapon:

A

AM.

threat to international peace, 68

J.

INT'L. L. 410, 417

(1973).
In spite

of frequent use of economic coercion by the West prior to

characterized as "blackmail."

One

critic

New York

Times, Feb.

noted that "the United States

7,

itself

1974,

1.

this event, the oil

embargo was

Col. 4.]

has been one of the worst offenders

in

using trade

ways which have adversely affected other countries. As a result of congressional pressures, the
President was given the authority to cut off aid to countries trading with Cuba or North Vietnam..." See
Gardener, The hard road to world order, 52 Foreign Affairs 567 (1974).
controls

in

Critics also

mentioned the "mirror image" principle, which envisages

that "the claims

one projects

against another will be reflected in similar claims against oneself, a doctrine equally applicable in
international law. Lillich, supra note, at 80.

Some

proponents of a wider interpretation of article 2(4) invoked arguments to substantiate

extreme views. Stone, for instance, believes that economic coercion violates

which he thinks protects a sovereignty broader than

Economic Coercion

in

Contemporary International Law, 79

article 2(4)

independence. See

political

AM.

J.

Tom

J.

of the Charter,

Farer, Political

and

iNT'L. L. 405, 405 (1985). Few even

think that economic sanction could constitute economic aggression against a sovereign nation. Such

extreme or radical views

may deny

the exclusive sovereign right of the coercing state to adopt foreign

policy rules that influence other states. During the Arab

United States could have exercised

its

perpetrated by the oil-producing Arab
economic sanction.)

right

oil

of self-defense

nations. Id. at

boycott, for instance,
in

many

stated that the

response to the "economic aggression"

405-407 (discussing the

legal

consequences of acts of

31

Western States have become more antagonistic

to the

view which attempts

economic coercion under the Charter of the United Nations. The
Department of State expressed the following view

to proscribe

legal advisor

in respect to the status

of the

US

of economic

coercion under international law, particularly under the Charter:
[T]he charter of the United Nations contains a number of very important

and far-reaching

on the use of armed force, but it says nothing
at all about restrictions on the use of economic measures of coercion by
individual states or group of states. Conceivably, economic measures
could give rise to a dispute, the convenience of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, within the meaning of
article 33 of the charter, but even that is nowhere made clear. Economic
pressure may be unfriendly and even unfair, but economic coercion, per
se, cannot generally be said to be prohibited by the UN charter.
restrictions

The apparent ambiguity

in the

meaning of the phrase merit

te

examination of the

records of the drafting of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco.

1.

Draft History of the Charter.

Resort to the records(travaux preparatoires)
achieve a definitive interpretation in this area.

and deliberations can help
Brazil

draft article

made
of

indispensable, given the failure to

This recourse to the legislative materials

to ascertain the legislative intent

the following

article

is

2(4):

"All

amendment proposal

members of

the threat or use

of the drafters of the Charter.

to the original

Dumbarton Oaks

the organization shall refrain in their

of force and from

and

international relations

from

economic measures

any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the organization."

in

the threat

use of
11

(emphasis supplied)

^'

Digest

USDIL (1976)

at

577.

OMAR ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-ENFORCIBLE MEASURES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 203(1988).
See also

Summary

report of the

1

1th

meeting of the committee,

I/I,

Doc. 784

I/I

27, June 5, 1945,

Documents of

the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945, Vol. IV, 331, at 334.
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The circumstances surrounding
the phrase

was conceived

the actual passage of the provision disclose that

to include the use

of economic coercion. To

this proposal, the

delegate of the United States remarked that "the intention of the authors of the original
text

was

phrase,

to state in the broadest

'in

any other manner'

terms 'an absolute,

was designed

to

all

inclusive prohibition.' and the

ensure that there

should be no

Concurring with the United States, the Belgian delegate noted that the

loopholes."

Brazilian delegation "had underestimated the effect of the modification
original text, calling attention, particularly to the phrase 'in

any other manner.'

Although the Brazilian amendment proposal was defeated,
traced to a reluctance

among member

states to

from the definition of the "use of force."
omitted because

it

was already included

a broad meaning of the

opposed

to

its

in the

"

defeat could not be

exclude the notion of economic coercion

Rather, the idea of economic coercion

was

any manner." This indicates

that

in the term, "in

word "force" was intended by

such an interpretation in principle.

the

member

states

and no one

The Brazilian amendment was not thus

rejected with the clear intention of confining the prohibition to

2.

made

armed

force.

Authentic Interpretation of the Charter by the General Assembly
In general, the practice

of individual

states

does not equate the use of economic

coercion with armed aggression; moreover, a distinct trend to restrict a nation's use of

economic and
trend

is

political

measures can be seen. In the practice of the United Nations,

supportive of a wider meaning of force in that

Id.San Francisco document,

''id

at

335.

its

meaning

is

this

generally "taken as

.
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bearing something more than armed force.

"''^

The

legal duty against the use

of economic

coercion finds a justification under the General Assembly resolution which prohibits the
use of economic sanction either as a use of force or contrary to the principle of nonintervention.

The General Assembly

dealt with the matter in certain of

The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on

the resort to

declarations.

the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the

Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of

condemned not only

its

their

Independence and Sovereignty

armed intervention but

also "all other forms of

interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state against

economic and

Most important of

cultural elements."

Declaration on Principles of International
operation in which

it

was proclaimed

that

all is

its

political,

the General Assembly's

Law Concerning

Friendly Relations and Co-

may

use or encourage the use of

"[N]o

state

economical, political or any other type of measure to coerce another state in order to
obtain from

it

it

the subordination of the exercise of

advantages of any kind."

A

its

sovereign rights and to secure from

77

closer look strongly reveals that the Declaration favors a broader interpretation

of the content that economic coercion constitute an act of breach of international law.
For instance, the ninth preambular paragraph of the annex of the Declaration

78

sets forth,

"the duty of states to refrain in their international relations from military, political,

economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the
territorial integrity

^^

See

ASRAT,

of any

supra note 68,

state.

at

1

"^^

According

to this statement, the references to

December 2 1

,

1

See
''id.

ASRART,

supra note 68,

at.

armed

in

favor and one abstention as General Assembly

965

^^G.A. Resolution 2625(XXV), 24 Dec. \91Q,UNGA0R, 25th
78

independence or

17.

This resolution was adopted by a vote of 109
Resolution 2131 (XX) of

political

1 1

7.

Sess.,

Supp.28(A/8028), 1970,

at 121.
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force and other forms of coercion are undifferentiated as to their legal character or

consequence when applied

to the protected rights

of states, reflecting the concept that the

prohibition of force covers other forms of economic and political coercion in addition to

armed

force.

In his discussion of the nature of the Declaration's support of a broader view of

the content of prohibited force, Obradivic wrote,

Both of these provisions

[the ninth

preambular paragraph and the second

paragraph of non-intervention] have been combined with the principle of
the non-use of force, particularly with the general formulation of the

prohibition under paragraph
are

1

of the principle, and clearly show that there

no grounds whatever for the concept of force

interpreted as applicable only to

These statements indicate

economic coercion.

armed

of force

member

interpretation of the Charter, a politico-legal instrument

is

understood to include

states stands as

whose

creation

consent of the international community of states and whose function
the behavior of the states that created

it.

be

force.

that the concept

This interpretation by the

in the Declaration to

is

is

an authentic

attributed to the

mainly to regulate

Therefore, the Declaraation of the general

assembly prohibiting the use of economic coercion stands as one body of law regulating
the application of economic sanction.

^°/c/.atll8.
*'

K.

OBRADOVIC, PROHIBITION OF USE OF FORCE,

in Principles

Friendly Relations and Cooperation 88 (M. Sahovic, ed., 1972)

of International

Law Concerning
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C. Understanding by the International

The
firm one

Law Commission(ILC)

International

,in this

Law CommissionaLC;)
has also taken a stand, though not a

controversy surrounding the meaning of use of force.

of the ILC on the

Law

The

draft articles

of Treaties, which subsequently resulted in the creation of the

Vienna Conference on the

Law

of Treaties

1968 and 1969, included a provision

in

dealing with the effect of the use of force in the conclusion of the treaties.

adoption by the Convention on the

devoid

if its

Law of Treaties read thus

under

article 52:

The

"A

final

treaty is

conclusions have been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of

the principle of international law

embodied

in the charter

of the United Nations."

Since the ILC could not obtain a consensus on the meaning of the use of force,
especially

leave

its

when

it

contained pressures of an economic or political nature,

it

opted to

interpretation open, as follows:

Any

interpretation of the principle that states are under an obligation to

refrain

from the threat or use of force

which

charter,

becomes

automatically have

its

effect

in violation

generally

on

accepted

of the principles of the
as

the scope of the rule

authoritative,

handed down

will
in the

present article.

Although attempts by some members

to

write an

amendment

providing for a clear prohibition of economic and political pressure innthe

breach of treaty law failed,

82

an agreement was finally reached to include a

May 23, 1969, art.52, 1155 UNTS 331.
ARANGIO-RUIZ THE U.N. DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-25 (1979).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,

0-1

See generally G.

^"^

(1966) 2

85
In

its

YB

Int'l L.

,

Comm'n,

commentary on

sec.5, 1966.

the provision, the

ILC reported

that

"some members of the Commission expressed

economy of a country, ought
The Commission, however, decided to

the view that any other forms of pressure, such as a threat to strangle the
stated in the article as falling within the concept of coercion."

to be

define coercion in terms of a threat or use of force in violation of the principles of the Charter,'2s. and

considered that the precise scope of the acts covered by this definition should be

left to

be determined

in

36
declaration to

accompany

which was voted

article

This declaration,

forms an integral part of the Conference.

for 102-0-4,

The declaration reads

52 of the Convention.

^^

as follows:

The United Nations Conference on

the

Law of Treaties,

Upholding the principle that every treaty in force
parties to it and must be performed in good faith,

is

binding upon the

Reaffirming the Principle of the sovereign equality of states,

Convinced

that states

must have complete freedom

relating to the conclusion

Deploring the
conclude

of a

fact that in the past states

treaties

in

performing an act

treaty.

have sometimes been forced to

under pressure exerted in various forms by other

states.

Desiring to ensure that in the future no such pressure will be exerted in any

form by any
1.

state in

connection with the conclusion of a treaty,

Solemnly condemns the

whether military,

political, or

threat or use

of pressure

economic, by any

in

any form,

state in order to coerce

another state to perform any act relating to the conclusion treaty in
violation of the Principles of the sovereign equality of states and freedom

of consent,
2.

Decides that the present Declaration

of the Conference on the

By

Law

form part of the Final Act

shall

of Treaties.

virtue of this Declaration, the intention of the International

to single out the use

Law Commission

of economic coercion as a ground of invalidating the effectiveness of

a treaty or as a cause of undermining the binding nature of the treaty between states

was

vividly stated.

The prohibition of economic coercion

as a

means of countermeasure

determined by the extreme nature of the measure taken

in

is

to

be

terms of the seriousness of the

potential consequences threatening the "territorial integrity or political independence" of
on

the state concerned.

practice

By

so incorporating the latter phrase from the wording of article

by interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Charter. See

See LTN Doc.A/Conf. 39/c.l/L.323,

UN

Conference on the

Id. at

256.

Law of Treaties, Second

Session, Official

Records, 101, Sec. 13: Documents of the Conference, 173 and 85.
87

Report of the Commission on the Work of its 47 th Session

(

Official

Record of the General Assembly,

37
2(4), the

ILC admitted

that both forcible

and non-forcible measures have a similarly

oo

This approach purposely avoided the controversy revolving around the

relevant effect.

meaning of the use of force or other forms of coercive
and practical resolution
prohibiting

economic

countermeasure, and

economic or

it

to the problem.

and

The ILC was aware
coercion

political

acts,^^ yet

would

it

offered a meaningful

that the broad formulation

be

a

total-prohibition

of

therefore limited the prohibition of such conduct only to extreme

political coercion.

The

draft article

of the ILC, the commentaries thereof,

and the reports of the special rapporteur are very relevant indications about the

development of the law

in this respect.

publicists, they also "constitute a stage in the

development of international
It

UN

work of

codification and progressive

law..."

can amply be observed that the use of the word "force"

usage of "armed forces" in the Charter.

qualifications under articles 41,

used elsewhere, whenever

The terms

The word "force"

provisions of the Charter.

work of known

In addition to being the

this

is

is

distinct

from the

are used differently in the various

applied in

some provisions without

42, 43, and 46, while the qualifying

meaning was intended.

word "armed" was

The exclusion and/or omission

50th Session, Supp No. 10(A/50/10) at 149-173.

See

Id.

on

ASRAT, supra note
^°
^'

68, 18-19.

Id. at 19.

THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY

LAW

137(1989).

Brownlie noted the sources as being "analogous
authoritative, are the draft articles

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
^^

Id. at

to the writings

LAW 26 (3rd. ed.

at least as

BROWNLIE,

1979).

130.

93

For example,

article

41 of the Charter read that " The Security council

involving the use of amed force are to be employed to give effect to

members of the United Nations
94

See

of publicist, and

produced by the international law commission..."

for

example

article

to apply these measures...."

45 of the Charter.

its

may

decide what measures not

decisions, and

it

may

call

upon the

38

of the phrase "armed force" could be construed as being demonstative of the awareness of
the drafters to

make such

Whenever they wanted

a distinction.

room

the drafters wTOte expHcitly without leaving any

to designate

for ambiguity.

armed

forces,

Furthermore, a

close reading of the text of the United Nations Charter favors a wider interpretation to the

meaning of the phrase "use of force." For

mechanism by

instance,

it

can be argued that the enforcement

the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter also envisages

measures "not involving the use of armed force," such as ruptures of economic

The Security Council may

resort to this enforcement

relations.

measure under Chapter VII

in

limited situations involving the threat to the maintenance of international peace and
security, as provided

under

article 39.

desire to encourage the use of

Although one might argue

economic measures under normal circumstances, the

subsequent practice of states does not tend to support

Attempts

to resolve the issue

of

illegality

this view.

of economic coercion

broader meaning of the "use of force" as manifested under
the

1970

Declaration

that the drafters did not

UN

on Friendly Relations may seem

in respect to the

Charter article 2(4) and in
to

contemporary and past practice. Even assuming that the black

be

letter

inconsistent

law

with

in the Charter

included the use of economic force in the generic meaning of the word "force"did not

seem

to

change the practice, nor did

it

even mold

it

to a certain extent to that effect.

Moreover, the classification of economic sanction as being under the category of force

would completely outlaw the use of economic sanctions
Generally speaking, the use of forcible counter-measures

law except

is

in international relations. 95

prohibited under international

in self-defense.

95 The Charter of the United Nations allows the use of armed reprisal or countermeasure only in cases of
self-defense and outlaws the use of force as a tool for enforcing the legal obligation of another state.
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of force"

If "use

is

defined broadly and includes economic sanction, then the

imposition of sanction becomes illegal per se as a means of coercing another state to

comply with

legal

its

The use of economic sanction

obligations.

circumstances involving self-defense.

Thus, a state

is

justified in

employing a

measure of self-defense against the use of physical force by another

would otherwise have been

illegal

under

admissible in

is

state,

unilateral

an act which

of the Charter. Similarly, economic

article 2(4)

sanctions can be carried out and can be justified under international law only as a

of self-defense against an act of aggression by another

For

all

means

state.

practical purposes, the legal duty against the use

of economic coercion

finds a better justification under the principle of non-intervention than under article 2(4)

The

of the Charter.

latter provision, at least in practice, pertains to a

violation under international law,

namely

the use of physical force.

It is

more

blatant

therefore safe to

conclude that the proscription of the conduct withheld under the 1970 Declaration
pertains only to

economic measures which are unlawful and

However, when an
legal

power

to use

illegal act

precedes the economic coercion, the coercing state has the

economic coercion

to restrain the

cases, the normative validity of such an act

international law,

interventionist in nature.

may

conduct of the target

state.

In such

not be subjected to any challenge under

and the measure does not breach the principle formulated

in the

1970

Declaration on Friendly Relations.

Moreover, the Declaration does not prohibit the overall imposition of economic
sanction in international relations; what

meant

either to secure advantages of

exercise the sovereign

power of a

it

does prohibit

any kind or
state.

is

the use of

economic coercion

to subordinate another state's right to

When

sanctions are imposed to coerce a

40

comply with

defaulting state to

comprise a restriction on the
It is

its

state's

argument

legal obligations, the

sovereign right

that the sanctions

is invalid.

plain that the present and past operation of the law and the practice of states

do not support the view
force. Since there

that

economic coercive measures are considered

to be the use

of

dooes not exist a practice supporting the view that use of force includes

economic coercions, then the arguement along

this

line

fall

short of any practical

significance. In addition to this, the expansive reading of "use of force" under the Charter

would

restrict the

use of economic countermeasures. According to such this view, the

enforcement of human rights utilizing economic sanction would thus be unlawful per se
as a consequence of the prohibition of forceful
invalidate the utilization of
virtue of calssifying

it

economic sanctions as

as a "use of forcce"

The following chapter

its

human

principles recognized under international law,

an attempt to

human

rights

by

of unilateral economic sanction

to

right

at

once.

norm

This type of action, as will be demonstrated,

policies.

Therefore,

tools for enforcing

would wrong

will discuss the use

induce the target to comply with a certain

reprisal.

namely

that

or to coerce the

is

contrary to

same

to alter

some of

the

of non-intervention and the

rules pertaining to the taking of countermeasures.

B.
I.

Economic Sanctions As Non-Forcible counterMeasures.
Act of Retorsion: The Sovereign Right of States.

While examining the
between

acts

retorsions.

legality

of economic sanctions, one must distinguish

of economic coercion which are reprisals from those that are mere

Whereas

retorsion

is

defined as an unfriendly but a lawful act which

may

be

41

may

taken by an aggrieved party against a wrongdoer^^, economic measures
as a reprisal

when

directed against a state

"it is

categorized

which has previously performed an

illegal

Retorsion can also be applied in response to an unfriendly though not unlawful act

act."

of another

state

and where there

is

no

legal obligation that the enforcer

is

committed

to

go

perform towards the
against a state
self-help

target,

as

opposed

which

are exclusively "directed

illegal act."

Therefore, unlike other

to reprisals,

which has previously performed an

mechanisms, retorsion can be carried out by a

state regardless

of whether a prior

violation of a legal obligation had existed or not.

Many
international

have resorted

states

law through the instrumentality of their own municipal laws.

law and

to protect its interests using its

the United States called for an

endangered

that

its

The United

abundantly utilized retortive measures to induce compliance with

States, for instance, has

international

of retorsion for unilateral enforcement of

to the use

domestic laws.

embargo on shipments of goods

national security, mainly the

USSR

and

In the Battle Act,

to countries

of destination

102
its satellites.

In addition,

the Foreign Assistance Act provided for the withdrawal of military aid to countries

engaged

^^

in systematic

QQ

5 (1984).

PIETER JAN KUYPER, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS,

Legal issues
98

rights.

ELIZABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANAYLSIS OF

COUNTERMEASURES
^^

and crude violations of internationally recognized human

in international

Trade 148 (Peter Sarcevic

ZOLLER, Supra note 96,at 5.
SCOTT DAVIDSON, HUMAN RIGHTS
ZOLLER. supra

note 96,

&

Han Van

148 (1993)

at 7.

Retorsion through municipal legislation does not need to be legitimatized
there

is

to grant

101,,

no principle under
it

international law that obligates state

foreign aid. Id. at

8.

„

Id. ax 8.

'°^U.S.C.
'^^

ss

1611 b/d.

Section 502 B, a(2)

in

Houtte, eds.)

SS 2394(Suppl.

Ill,

1979).

in a strictly legal sense,

A to export its

strategic

goods

because

to state

B

or

42

The

right to acts

power of states

states.

The

including the withdrawal of foreign aid,

may

of retorsion emanates from the sovereign right of

to regulate their

own

affairs,

be categorically defined as the sovereign attributes of states. The principle of sovereignty
is

a rule of international law guaranteeing states with the exclusive right to regulate their

internal

and external matters and foreign relations

in

any way they want without

This shows the doctrinal muddle inherent in the

interference from another entity.

concept of sovereignty. The paradox arising out of the scope of the exercise of
is difficult to

define, for

same

the exercise of the

this right

absolute exercise will have a direct indirect ramification on

its

right

whole concept of sovereignty

by another

state.

Buchheit demonstrated the paradox of the

in the following statement:

The notion of sovereignty is at best a metaphysical concept describing a
situation in which no nation has ever found itself The mere existence of
other nations implies at least a minimal constraint in the freedom of any
In a multinational world, any

particular state.

the feeling of

extent that
free,

it

upon a

is

it

its

member

state

must consider

neighbors before taking action that affects them.

must so

it

is

To

the

not free, and to the extent that such state in not

not truly sovereign. But to say that there are practical constraints

nation's

freedom of action

is

a far different thing from saying that

there are legal, or perhaps even moral restriction

on

its

freedom.

The

proposition that the principles of international law exist independently of
the respect given to

them by individual nations

is at

best arguable and

probably unsupported by the history of international behavior.

Although a

own

state

sovereignty, the exercise of the

exercise of the same.

'"'*

has the exclusive authority to regulate matters pertaining to

LEE

the Charter

the

right

power of the

by other

states

C. Buchheit, 77?^ Use

of the United Nations,

ECONOMIC ORDER

ofNon
in

impedes the unlimited

state to exercise its rights is limited to the

BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

See IAN
See

Thus

same

Violent coercion:

A

LAW

187 (1990).

study in the Legality under Article 2(4) of

ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

(Richard Lillich, ed.,1976).

its
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extent that

it

cannot breach

its

international legal obligations '°^

and must respect the

sovereignty of other states.

The
is

right to act

of retorsion flows from

not, generally speaking, regulated

through economic measures

between

relations

is

of states and

this abstract, "natural" right

under international law. For example, a retortive act

not unlawful per se because trade or other economic

states are not required

by law and are only matters of

'°^

practice.

Hence, to cut off normal trade relations and/or other economic benefits from a
does not comply to

its

may

international obligation

nations but only to the extent that
other states impossible.

It

is

it

which

state

be a permissive act under the law of

would not render

the exercise of the sovereignty by

important to draw the line where one's exercise of a

sovereign right passes the limit and intervenes in the exercise of the sovereign right of
another
such,

it

Although the

state.

is

not,

right

of retorsion

is

not governed by international law as

however, insignificant to international law-at

least, its effects are

not

insignificant.

2.

The Rule Against Intervening

in the Affairs

of Other States: Constraint on the Right of

Retorsion

A corollary to the doctrine of state
is

a necessary product and effect of the

Still,

the fact of being

bound by

the consent of which can only

See

sovereignty

DAVIDSON,
See

In the

intervention in

principle.

its

supra note 99,

which

The exclusive sovereign

impetus under the sovereignty of states,

create, shape, define and determine the existence of international law

DAVIDSON, supra note

SS Case,

first

the principle of non-intervention,

international obligation find

itself.

at 47-48.

See generally Kuyper, supra note 97,
108

is

at

49-53.

99, at 48.

Permanent Court of Justice articulated the existence of the right against nonthe following way: "The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a
the

state, is that-failing the

existence of a permanent rule to the contrary^'it

may

not exercise

its

power

in

any

44
jurisdiction over one state's internal affairs

intervening in those affairs.
itself the exclusive

sovereignty

is

to regulate

it

its

internal

cannot

make

sovereignty bestows upon

state's

and external

of

affairs, its exercise

policy determinations in the internal

state.

legal definition

elastic nature

naturally deprive other states from

Conversely, whereas a

not absolute in that

matters of another

The

power

would

of intervention has, however, been controversial due to the

of the meaning of the word.

Many have

ways, though as incorporating various scopes.

defined

it

Most agree

in

an essentially similar

that

it

does not mean

meddling, for this interpretation would even classify the issuance of any statement of a
concerning

state

interference.

the

pursuit

of domestic

policy

of another

Davidson defines interference as "an attempt by one
of another."

state-like functions within the territory

Likewise,

an

as

state

state to

De Lima

of

act

perform

define the

essence of intervention as involving a state of affairs in which one state aims to compel
another state to do or to refrain fi-om doing something, "which,
do."

The

through

economic

left to itself, it

intervention could take place either through the use of

coercion,

but

what

really

matters

in

the

would not

armed force or

distinction

between
1

intervention and interference

is

1

the coercive nature or the threat used thereof.

Therefore, issuance of any statement of condemnation or any unfi-iendly act towards

another state that does not amount to a compulsive coercive

form
'°^

act, is interference

the territory of another state." See S.S Lotus Case, P.C.I.J., (1927) Ser. A, No. 9,

in

DAVIDSON,

supra note 99,

at 48.

Also

See

ZOLLER, Supra note

at.

and not

18.

96, at 7

'''id

'"Mat

48.

"^5ee F.X. DE LIMA, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A REFERENCE TO THE
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 15-16 (1971).
"^

/^.

atl6.
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intervention.

The generally unregulated
of non-intervention

in

right

of retorsion has to be examined with the principle

mind. The prohibition against non-intervention

principle under customary international law, and hence does not have

codified sources. If there

any significant

is

is

many

basically a

conventional

effort or attempt in this direction, the matter is

examined under the various declarations and resolutions of the General Assembly. The
General Assembly of the United Nations has allotted a significant amount of its labor and
time to adopting a variety of resolutions in the area.

3.

Declaration of Principles of International Concerning Friendly Relations and

Co-operation

Among

States in

Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

This Declaration of Principles, which was unanimously adopted by the General

Assembly of the United Nations as Resolution 2625 (XXV) in October 1970, embodies a
number of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation,

now

constituting "a ver>' important substantial and important corpus of prescriptions."

At present, the

definition, provided

under the

1

970 Declaration,

is

generally accepted as

an authentic and a "precise statement of the rule of non-intervention under customary
international law."

It

defines the principle as follows:

No

state or

for

any reason whatever

state.

group of

states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
in the internal or external affairs

Consequently, armed intervention and

all

of any other

other forms of interference

'''id

"^ G. ARANGIO-RUIZ

THE U.N. DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE
SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).
,

1

The incorporated

principles are: (a) the principle that states shall refrain in their international relation from

the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any

other

manner

inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations; (b) the principle that states shall settle

their international matters so that

peace and security and justice are not endangered; the duty not to

intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state in accordance with the charter; (d) the
dut>'

of states

to co-operate with

one another

and self-determination of peoples;
states shall fulfill in

good

(f)

in

accordance with the charter;

(e) the principle

of equal rights

the principle of sovereign equality of states; and (g) the principle that

faith the obligations

assumed by them

in

accordance with the charter of the

United Nations. This declaration was marked as an instrument designed to ensure the peaceful coexistence

among states founded upon varying political, economic social and
"^ Nicaragua (Nicar.v. U.S.) (merit) 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 109-110.

cultural backgrounds. Id. at 3.
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or attempted threats against the personaHty of the state or against

economic and cuhural elements are

poHtical,

in violation

its

of international

law.

This Declaration sets forth "the duty of states to refrain in their international

from

relations

military, political,

economic and any other form of coercion aimed against

the political independence or territorial integrity

being in violation of international law.

of any

state "

and describes

(emphasis supplied) The third principle in the

Declaration addresses the case of economic coercive measures in

No

state

may

their use as

its

second paragraph:

use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other

type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from
subordination of the exercise of

its

it

the

sovereign rights and to secure from

it

advantages of any kind.

4.

The 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
Article

of Chapter

1

of this Charter stipulates

1 1

of economic coercion and the right of freedom of

in general

states against

terms the prohibition

economic coercion.

It

declares,

"Every

system

accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or

in

threat in

state

has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose

^^^SeeG.A. Res. 2625, 25

The Declaration

lists

UNGAOR,
its

following statement: "[N]o State

UN

Supp. No.28,

to secure

Supp.28(A/8028), 1970,

at 12.

U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).

third principle. This principle

may

from

it

of non-intervention was contained

from

it

the subordination of the exercise of

advantages of any kind." See G.A. Res. 2625, 25

Doc. A/8028 (1970).

^^^See G.A. Res. 3281, U.N.

GAOR,

in the

use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of

to coerce another state in order to obtain

and

at 121,

Sess.,

the "duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, in

accordance with the charter" as

measure

economic

any form whatsoever."

"^ G.A. Resolution 2625(XXV), 24 Dec. \970,UNGAOR, 25th

rights

its

29th

sess.,

Supp. No. 31,

at 52.

UNGAOR,

its

sovereign

Supp. 28,

p.

121,

47

Article 7 has attempted to elaborate

state to

choose

its

own

this principle

path of development and utilize

create the corollary obligation

exercise of that right."

on

12

on other

states to

Also important

is

by asserting the "right of a

own economic

its

resource and

remove the obstacles hindering

article

17,

which

stresses that

the full

economic

assistance to developing countries should be "consistent with their development needs

and objectives, with

strict

respect for the sovereign equality of the states and free of any

conditions derogating from their sovereignty."

The

of these instruments of the General Assembly, including those

legal effect

already mentioned, has itself been debated
varied widely. For example,

among many

scholars.

Brower and Tepe undermine the

simply attaching a political flavor by saying that "there

is

effect

persuade the developed states to be legally bound by

charter."

Nonetheless,

to the understanding

Effect of General

stated.

all

the terms of the

What

is

fundamental

of the development of a codified norm regulating non-intervention

the place of the General

5.

does not seem to be as simple as

of these provisions by

not sufficient reciprocity of

interest to

it

Their opinions have

Assembly Resolutions

in the sphere

is

of international law.

Assembly Resolutions

Generally speaking, the legal status of resolutions has been controversial; they

have been regarded as being only recommendations or as being declarations of existing
binding rules. The United States and some other nations do not attribute any legal effect

'^'

Id.
122

Id.aiSA.
123

See Brower

International

& Tepe,

Law?

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of states: A Reflection or Rejection of

9 International Lawyer (1975).

48

Assembly

to General

aspiration"

them merely

resolutions and regard

as "statements of political

On

or as statements that depict the expectations of the world community.

the contrary, others consider

them

to

be authentic and authoritative interpretations of the

provisions of the United Nations Charter by the body which

world community.

"""

others

Still

resolutions by asserting that

some

attribute

a

legal

is

most representative of the

character to

General

Assembly

resolutions are proofs of the existence of state practice,

providing strong evidence on the crystallization of state practice and being the final

evolvement of the issue

to

embrace the notion of the
.

.

opmion juris.

instant creation

Few

of these exponents also

of custom whose constituent element

is

only

127

Between
legislative

customary international law.

the

two extreme

doctrinal positions that the General

and a quasi-legislative power and the opposite view

Assembly has a

that resolutions

of the

General Assembly are of no legal vail-is a middle ground. The middle position sees a
General Assembly resolution as having a partial
declaration or merely a recommendation.

understood as having no effect or a minor
to

the extent that they

are

assertions
128

interpretations

of the

Charter.

125

See
,

DAVIDSON,

supra note 99,

depending on whether

it

is

Recommendations of the General Assembly
effect,

And

yet

another
its

view recognizes the General

law making power.

Casteneda says

at 57.

,

KAMAL HOSSAIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

124(1980).
127
Id. ax 99.

See

BLAINE SLOAN, UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION IN A

CHANGING WORLD 44-45

(1991).

are

while declarations produce a legal effect

Id. at 57.

'^^

a

of existing general international law or are

Assembly's quasi-legislative role as opposed to

'^'^

effect,

49
that the General

Assembly does not have the power

"authoritatively prove

its

to create

law but

through the Charter.

131

practice.

any

state.

Its

may

to

the General

Assembly

foundation could be attributed either to the universal

of the General Assembly or

to

development through years of

its

The power of the General Assembly has not been

As

resolutions

existence".

However, such declaratory power was not vested

representation

its

persistently challenged

by

Professor Schachter wrote.

In the last few years,

we have

witnessed an increasing insistence on the

authoritative character of General

self-determination,

territorial

Assembly Resolutions on

human

occupation,

rights,

intervention,

of

sharing

resources and foreign investment. They purport to "declare the law,- either
in general

terms or as applied to a particular case.

intent are they

the General

recommendatory. Surprising as

Assembly

to

it

may

Neither in form nor
seen, the authority of

adopt such declaratory resolutions was accepted

from the very beginning.

Declarations of the General Assembly are said to express the "intent to declare
law, whether customary, general principle, or instant, spontaneous or

new

law, and

when

they are adopted by a unanimous or nearly unanimous vote, or by consensus, there

presumption that the rules and principles adopted

Moreover,

article 13(l)(a)

in

the

declaration

are

is

law."

of the Charter of the United Nations empowers the Assembly

no

CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS(1969)).
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING,
336 (2nd ed. 1993]CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
See also

RESOLUTIONS(1969)).
'^°

SLOAN,

supra note 128,

at

46.

supra note 128,

at

45 {quoting, Oscar Shachter, The Crisis of Legitimization

'''
Id.

SLOAN,

in the

United

Nation, Alf Ross Memorial Lecture, Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret, Vol. 50 (1981) at 3-4.
'^^/cy.at 151.

a

50
to

make recommendations

for the purpose

development of international law and

of promoting and encouraging the progressive
codification.

its

For example, while adopting

resolution 2625, the General Assembly's intent to operate within the scope of article
13(l)(a)

itself,

was

reflected under the seventeenth preambular paragraph of the resolution

which read
...the

in part,

adoption of the declaration on principles of international

concerning friendly relations and co-operation
with

the

charter

of the

among

states in

Nations... would

United

strengthening of world peace and constitute a
development of international law and relations among

law

accordance

contribute

to

the

landmark

in

the

states. ..the principle

of equal rights and self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant
contribution to contemporary international law.

Consequently, one can conclude that the Declaration on Friendly Relations

simply a venture without normative effect and

economic coercion, incorporated

own upon

the

members. The

validity.

The prohibition of

of a

threat to the political independence or subordinate the sovereign right

state

not

the use of

in the Declaration, has, therefore, a legal effect

difficult task is to identify those acts

is

of

its

which pose a

of other

states.

6 Ground for Determining Intervention Based on an Objective Test
In deciding if an

economic sanction

is

legally permissible

by virtue of being an

of retorsion or impermissible by virtue of being in violation of the rule against non-

act

intervention, one

must examine two key

and

The

its effect.

factors: the

intention of a certain

motive behind the economic sanction

economic conduct, rather than

its

outcome,

the deciding factor in determining whether the conduct affects another or not.

'^^
1

See G.A. Res. 2625, 25

UNGAOR,

Supp. No.28,

at 121,

U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).

16

Derek W. Bowett, Economic coercion and reprisals by

state, in

ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE

NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 50 (Richard Lillich, ed.,1976).

is

51
In order to give a reasonable

meaning

to the formulation

of the legal obligation

contained in the 1970 Declaration, Bowett proposed that the English law on the

economic conspiracy be used
coercion.

He

as a

means of

testing the unlawful nature

of

tort

of economic

wrote:

of conspiracy evolved to cover a situation in which two or more

...the tort

persons conspire to commit acts which are lawful per

by the desire

to injure the

economic

interest

protect the interest of the defendants.

se,

but are motivated

of the plaintiff rather than to

Such an emphasis upon predominant

purpose would probably provide a more effective criterion for defining

economic coercion then the notions of "subordination of sovereign

illegal

rights"

"securing

or

used

advantages"

in

the

Assembly

General

Resolution.

As compared
economic or

to the general prohibition

political

coercion

is

limited

of use of force, the "prohibition against

to

measures

those

aimed

are

that

for

unacceptable ends such as the subordination of the exercise of the sovereign rights of the
target state or securing advantages of

economic coercions are prohibited.
state to protect its competitive

any kind."

is

brought about

right to regulate

hand,

if the

of any

economic

its

measure

state or in

at the

is

economic advantage
is

seen as inherent in the idea that one's

relations is perceived

Apparently, a

from

state's

this perspective.

On

the other

any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN,"

Of course, one

needed item

Nor can one maintain

to state B.

1

cannot assert that state

that state

A

must buy

A

should

36,at 69.

SeeBuchheit, supra note 105, at 68.
/^.at68.

See Parry, Defining Economic Coercion

1

in International

Law, 12 Tex. INT L

it

is

sell

a

state B's products.

139

141

sovereign

targeted against "the territorial integrity or political independence

of power.

Bowett, supra note

kinds of

are acceptable acts of retorsion

expense of another's.

illegitimate or an abuse

138

all

For instance, economic measures undertaken by a

because protecting one's competitive advantage
prosperity

Consequently, not

L.J.

4 (1977).

52

However, the abrupt termination or interference with an estabhshed trade pattern may
not be permitted if the action causes political or other unreasonable repercussions that are

tantamount to being an act of interference. Therefore,
retorsion

may

violate international

law due

to its

it

can be considered that the right of

improper motive, undesirable effect and

'''^

disproportional character.

The commonly reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction, which
principle of sovereignty entails, as

The sovereignty of a

other states.

its

political

retortion

state

does not justify

independence and sovereignty of other
neither unlimited nor

is

is

guarded by the

corollary, the non-intervention in the affairs of

commission of an unlimited

its

of retorsion which leads to an abuse of rights and which

act

is

it

states.

The

may

negatively impact the

right to resort to

an act of

incognizant of the rights of other states.

Any

attempt to justify unilateral economic coercion as an absolute, unlimited right of states to

of retorsion

acts

is

This does not however

wrong.

economic sanctions which are meant neither
rather to coerce another state to

comply with

mean

that the test

to further political or

its

economic

Jonathan

Chamey, Third State Remedies

I.

in International

citing the Declaration of Principle of International

among

States,

G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.GA.OR, 25th

which provides

that:

"No

states

measures to coerce another
right

and

to secure

from

it

may

,

expressing the view

state in order to obtain

that the theory

143

For a similar statement, see

A

MICH.

J.

human

rights.

Int'L L. 57, 60, (1989).(

Friendly Relations and Co-operations

Supp. No. 28,

at

21, U.N. Doc.

A/ 8028 (1980)

from

it

the subordination of the exercise of

its

sovereign

advantages of any kind")

Also see Zoller, supra note 96,

peace:

interests but

use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of

Also see Oscar Schachter, International law
1982)

Law, 10

Law Concerning
Sess.,

at

9

,

in

theory

and practice, 178 Rec. des Cours

of abuse of right

may

stating that retorsion lies in the "grey

Omer

175, 185-87 (v-

be relevant in the regard.

zone law and non-law."

Y. Elagab, The Legitimacy of Economic Coercion, Development and

Semi-anna! Journal Devoted to Economic, Political and Social Aspect of Development 62-63

(Vol.5., 1984).

to

legal obligations.

Let's see the conceptual nature of this approach as applied to

''^^

would apply

53
7

The

Principle Against Inten^ention and

More

human

rights are

meant

are

rights.

meant

The

to protect individuals

is

from

meant

of high importance therefore

state or is

human

acts

if

human

is

governments would not have reason

two

to

'

is

obtained, the situation of

to

human

rights

Their enforcement therefore rests on the

Had

it

not been for this,

accede to instruments which they would have no

norms of human

as a result gives rise to a situation

rights without having the slightest intention

be bound by the same.
Incorporated in the concept of non-intervention

jurisdiction,

''*''

classifications determine if

guarded by the doctrine of non-intervention

Such lack of enforcement

states subscribe to the

states.

under the domestic jurisdiction of a

voluntary trend of compliance of the state themselves.

where

rights

commitments of states which require absolute compliance

under special category.

"perceived interest".

human

from interference from other

rights fall

with international obligations once consent
fall

to

of their own government, while the principle

to protect states

rights situation in a given country

instruments

to the forefront in the

The laws pertaining

an area of international concern. One of the

or not. Moreover, unlike other

comes

principle against intervention and that of the notion of

to protect different interests.

agamst non-mtervention
It is

Rights

often than not, the issue of non-intervention

discussion of

human

Human

which demarcates the

line

is

a subconcept of domestic

between matters of domestic law and international

DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS

85

(1994).
'"'^

Richard A. Falk, Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights,

COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION
'^^5e.ld.
'''id.

29

(

Richard

P.

Claude

in

HUMAN

& Bums H.

RIGHTS IN THE
Weston,

WORLD

eds., 1989).
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The two systems of jurisprudence have a

law.

prevalence of one leads to the erosion of the other.

easy to draw.

The boundary drawn
With

intervention in states."

this

at

jurisdiction

The

line

between these two

is

not

a certain point reflects "the line of permissible

boundary

involves the treatment of a state of

on each other; the

direct effect

its

and hence protected by the

own

in

mind, one must decide whether a case

nationals,

which

under

is

its

rule against non-intervention, or

domestic

whether the

matter involves an area of international concern where the principle of domestic
jurisdiction ceases to apply.

The matter was
Assembly which

indirectly addressed in the

prohibits the use of

1970 Declaration of the General

economic coercion when

advantages of any kind or to subordinate the rights of another

Although no

relates to coercion

its

own

which a
state's

was made

direct reference

on a

state that

to

impacts

human

its

own

sovereignty.

state

used either to secure

on Friendly Relations.

rights, the latter objective evidently

political independence-its right to regulate

domestic affairs-including the treatment of
state treats its

it is

its

own

nationals.

The matter

in

subject has naturally been one of the typical attributes of

For that matter, the Declaration of the General Assembly

in the

sphere of the principle of non-intervention was dictated by the motive of setting up a
legal

regime protecting

states

from such intervention mostly

rights violations. Therefore, the act

in cases

of alleged human

of enforcing human rights in a given

state

through the

use of a retortive economic act contravenes the general principle of international law
relating to intervention

148

MCLOLDRICK,

149
Id.ai 85.

'''id.

and sovereignty.

supra note 144,

at 85.
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The summary records of the
responsible

for

emergence of two schools of thinking
intervention

and human

committee of the General Assembly, which was

on non-interference

provision

the

sixth

delegates

nonintervention "could not be construed to

fundamental human rights of
the entire world

its

community."

152

Declaration,

this

in reference to the relationship

Some

rights.'^'

in

mean

asserted

that

that

reveals

the

between non-

the

of

principle

a country could violate the

citizens without that violation

becoming the concern of

The momentum however, grew

in the direction

of the

thinking that particularly emphasized certain categories of human rights violations which
essentially transcend the scope of domestic jurisdiction.

Such violations include denial of

the right to self-determination, genocide, apartheid and actions that endanger international
1

peace and security.

53

Upholding such a contention

both as a matter of law and

any measure

The
the

to the effect

of enforcing

state,

even

hegemonic

at the cost

amount

denying

to

human

rights not having the

its

above characteristics

basis in the protection of states

should not be easily eroded

states,

of protecting

human

at the discretion

'^'

is

RIGHTS

in

which

purported to protect.

MENNO T. KAMMINGA,

INTER-STATE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF

HUMAN

77(1992).

'^^

Mr. Brewer (Liberia), November

17, 1967,

'^^

November

12, 1962,

Mr. Okony (Nigeria),

UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1001, para.
UN Doc. A/c.6/sr.757, par. 1.)

2.

154

See EIDE, supra note 40,

Id

at 5.

at 3-5.

This was what was reflected

in the

1986 holding of the ICJ

court held that Nicaragua has the right to choose

its

political

intervention or any act of coersion from an external force.

of

form the basis of the law

and order, the non or/and loose regulation of which endangers the regime

law

from

rights because the observance of the

principle of sovereignty and the rule against non-intervention

international

,

the premise that states do not have a discretion to take

principle of non-intervention, having

interference of

every

fact,

will obviously

in the

Nicaragua case where the

and economic path without external

56
Nonetheless,

it

should not be conceived under any circumstances that the normal

conduct of economic activity with a

amounts

to the approval

rights

breached

of such infringements by other

that states should use international

human

state that has

by the defaulting

forums

state.

its

states.

to challenge the

human
'

rights obligations

Rather,

it

means

that

non-observance of norms of

This will be discussed

at

a latter section of the

paper covering the area of collective sanctioning.

C. Unilateral Economic Sanctions as Reprisal Countermeasures

The discussion on countermeasures
strictly

will be limited only to reprisals that are

regulated under international law and does not include retorsion which has already

To begin

been discussed.

with, the terms "legitimate counter-measure" and "sanction"

are interchangeably used in the context of this paper.

countermeasure
reprisals

is

which are interchangeably designated

The normal conduct of economic

activity with

move

The US embargo
but

in

is

shall focus only

on

Cuba does not

necessarily

amount

to the approval

of

the right of the United States to challenge Cuba's international

may

be, in the event of violation of

See generally Michael Krisky and David Golove

Cuba 20-25(1993).
against Cuba

Against

we

as countermeasures.

policies at the appropriate international forum, as the case
rights.

Consequently, a reference to

understood as excluding acts of retorsion and

Cuba's internal policies, not do they

human

158

(eds.),

norms of

United States Economic Measure

not challenged only in terms of the sovereign rights of other countries

the degree of magenalization that the United States has sustained convening

its

Cuba

policy. Id.at 21.

'"5eeld.
158

International

the draft articles

(1979) 2

YB

Law Commission
on

opted to replace

state responsibility

Int'L L.

Comm'n,

Part

II,

its

use of the word "sanction" with "countermeasure"

in

because the notion of sanction designated a "punitive consequence."
at

115-1 16.
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1.

Non-forcible Countermeasures and Their Legality under International

The use of non-forcible countermeasures,
international

classic

law,

denotes

"

also

known

as the right of reprisal under

an aggrieved party

that

responding to "an objectionable behavior on the part of another
legal system, a

wronged individual commonly seeks

a court; in the international legal order, a

remedy.

Noting

observed in

article 9(1)

injured state

is

of part two of the draft

entitled,

by way of

may

state.

"'^

be justified

In the domestic

state

can resort to a unilateral

be invoked in cases of breach, Riphagen

articles

reprisals, to

on

state responsibility that

suspend the performance of

"[T]he
other

its

1

obligations towards the state

which has committed the

economic

Accordingly,

sanction,

c.-\

internationally wrongful act."

being

as

a

form

of countermeasure

international law, can be justified as a state's right against a state that has breached

international

obligations toward the

wronged

in

redress through a third party such as

wronged

that responsibility is likely to

Law

state.

in

its

Hence, suspension of a treaty

obligation in force, confiscation of goods, economic embargoes and boycotts are possible

countermeasures.

Therefore, economic measures through the suspension of a bilateral

treaty or the freezing

of the assets of another country, despite their coercive character, are

legitimate if taken in response to prior breaches of obligation. Their legitimacy emanates

'^^

ZOLLER, supra note 96, at 5-6.
ELAGAB, supra note 71, at 44.

'^'

ZOLLER,

supra note 96,

Riphagen, Sixth Report on

at 4.
(I)

The Content, Forms and Degrees of State

Responsibility, and

The

Implementation of International Responsibility and the Settlement of Disputes, Doc. A/CN.4/389, 2 Apr.
1985).

See Denis Alland, International Responsibility and sanctions : Self defense and counter measures

ILC condificaion of rules governing

OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

international responsibility, in

147 (Marina Spinedi

8c

Bruno Simma,

Also See Derek W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse

to

in the

UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION
eds.,

1987).

Armed Forces, 66 AM.

J.

INT'L. L. 1(1972).
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from the occurrence of the

illegal act that

has to be noted from the outset that countermeasures do not contradict the

It

principle of non-intervention.

is

It

important to see cases that reinforce the view that

matters are subject to domestic jurisdiction if they are not

certain

In the case of

international obligation.

1979,

has preceded the economic measure.

the

US

subject to

an

diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran in

Court of Justice ruled out the objection of Iran that the

International

ramifications of the Islamic revolution in Iran were "essentially and directly within the
national sovereignty of Iran" in the following manner:

Whereas

it

is

of no doubt true that the Islamic revolution of Iran

is

a matter

"essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran"; whereas,

however, a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and
the

of internationally protected persons, and involves the

detention

or

interpretation

its

of

conventions

multilateral

law governing diplomatic and consular

international

which by

application

very nature

The statement of

the ICJ

have a sovereign right to defy

falls

is

its

relations,

KAMMINGA, 5M/7ra note
US

concisely stipulates that a defaulting state "does not

A

legal obligations."

similar

view was

Law

reflected

Concerning

151, at 132.

Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports 1979,
In a later case

one

is

within international jurisdiction.'^^

during the debate on the Declaration on Principles of International

'"

codifying

at

15-16.

of 1986, the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities

in

and Against Nicaragua,

the ICJ described the principle of non-intervention as constituting 'part and parcel of customary
international law' and elaborated the concept mainly in light of the General Assembly's resolution in the
area:

A

prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each state

permitted, by the principle of sovereignty, to decide freely.

One of these

is

economic, social and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy. Intervention
wrongful when

it

'^^

defines,

and indeed forms the essence

particularly obvious in the case of an intervention

Activities in

RICHARD

ORDER 70

B.

and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua

LILLICH,

(1976).

is

uses methods of coercion in regard to such choices which must remain free ones.

The element of coercion, which
is

is

the choice of a political,

v.

which uses

United

of,

prohibited intervention,

force. Military

states),

and Paramilitary

1986, para.295.
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Friendly Relations and Co-operation

Dutch representative

would

Among

States in

Accordance with the Charter, The

stated:

what region of the world
may find itself in a position of suffering damage from illegal
act on the part of another state, and for that reason, would be justified in
taking measures of non violent reprisals.
I

like to stress that

any

state,

no matter

to

belongs,

it

Consequently, the right to sovereignty and the rule against non-intervention does

way

not in any

transcend a

obligation under international law, and any measure

state's

that is targeted to coerce a defaulting state to

Economic sancdons may not

permissible.

motive for

their imposition is the

comply with

which has

to

is

international obligation

is

constitute an unlawful intervention if the

enforcement of international law, which

constituted from conventional or customary resources. '^^
responsibility that

its

evoked; the issue of whether

human

The puzzle

is

may

the degree of

regime

rights is a self-contained

be enforced by procedures within the treaty or

if

it

is

be

possible to evoke state

responsibility outside of the treaty.

'^^
169

UNGAOR,23rd
The

6th com.l045th mtg.,13 dec. 1963.

sess.,

International Court of Justice has put forward the following kinds of huinan rights as having their

basis in customary international law: genocide, racial discrimination, and "[w]rongfully to deprive

beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constant

KAMMINGA, supra note,

at

in

A

Law of the

Institute has similarly

134 (citing Case Concerning

US

Id. at

Diplomatic and

envisaged the following

in its third

restatement of the

United States:

state violates international

(a)

Id. at

Tehran,

The American Law
Foreign Relations

human

conditions of hardship." See

23 (citing the Case Concerning Reservations to the Genocide. See also

133 {citing Namibia Case ,1971 I.C.J. 57). Also

Consular Staff

in

law

if,

as a matter of state policy,

it

practices, encourages or

condones

Genocide,

(b)

Slavery or slave trade,

(c)

The murder

(d)

Torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,

(e)

Prolonged arbitrary detention

or causing the disappearance of individuals,

(0

Systematic racial discrimination, or

(g)

A

consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized

RESTATMENT THIRD, supra note 64,

S.702.

human

rights.
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2.

Conditions for Legitimate Economic Countermeasure
It is

not difficult to find quite a

lot

of evidence under international law supporting

the legitimacy of non-forcible countermeasures, although this rule

worded

Although

exceptions.

countermeasures,

it

I

legitimate or not.

is

70

economic

sanctions

are

is

reduced by strongly

treated

as

non-forcible

the scope and nature of the exercise of this right that renders

The

non-judicial nature of the

understood as being "extra legal".

International

remedy should not be

law

in

any way

stipulates guidelines for the lawful

use of countermeasures; consequently, acts of reprisals are admissible under
1

international law, subject to certain limitations.

part

two of the

draft articles, dealt with

72

The

them

International

modem

Law Commission,

in

and squarely addressed the issue of the legitimate

scope of application of countermeasures.

3.

Prior breach as a condition for legitimate counter-measures.

As

a rule, reprisals are admissible only as a response by the state which has been

subjected to an internationally wrongful act; therefore, the commission of a wrongful act

is

170

a prerequisite to the legitimacy of the reprisal.

ELAGAB, supra note 7 at 4
MERON, supra note 91, at 234.

See
'^'

172

1

,

The debate on

draft article 30,

1

Peter Malanczeek. Counter Measures

and Self Defense as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness

in

Law Commission 's Draft Articles on State responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS
CODIFICATIN OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 212 (M. Spinedi &B. Simma, eds., 1987).
the International
173

See Debates on Draft Art. 30 Concerning Legitimate Application of Sanctons, YILC,

58.

See

Id.

vol.1,

1979, at 55-

61

concerning

state responsibility, deals

The wrongfulness of an
of that

state

with this issue:

act

of a

towards another

state not in

state is

conformity with an obligation

precluded

if the act constitutes a

measure legitimate under international law against that other state, in
consequence of an internationally wrongful act of that other
(emphasis added)

state,

Therefore, the principle under international law that countermeasures can be
utilized

by an aggrieved party depends basically upon the existence of a prior breach. To

this effect, a tribunal in the case

concerning the

indicated

law

that

international

a

set

air services

on

limit

agreement of March 27, 1946,

one's

resort

to

non-forcible

countermeasures:
If a situation arises,

which, in one

state's

an international obligation by another

view, results in the violation of

state,

the first state in entitled,

within the limit set by the general rules of international law pertaining to
the use of armed force, to affirm

The

right through counter measures.

its

deliberations of the sixth committee of the General

Assembly on

the

Principle of Friendly Relations, the representative of the Netherlands asserted that such
"reprisals

were admissible solely

in cases

where the

state

against

which they were

directed had committed acts which constituted violation of international law in respect of

Hence, the existence of a prior breach and the

the state engaging in the reprisals."

taking of the countermeasure by the aggrieved party in response to that
for the imposition

'^^

'^^
'^^

(1979) 2

YB

Int'L L.Comtn'n, part

See International

UNGAOR,

of economic sanction having a character of reprisal.

Law

II,

at

115.

Reports, 54(1979) at 337.

23rd Sess., 6th Com., 1095th mtg., Dec.

13, 1968, para.

9

at 3.

is

a precondition
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4.

Other Conditions Limiting the use o f

Economic Sanction

Human

for

Rights Purposes.

In addition to the obvious condition that reprisal can only be taken in response to

a prior illegal conduct of a defaulting state,
fulfillment of other conditions, depending

norms of

law.

international

Article

its

legitimacy

on the discernible

is

still

effect

it

dependent on the

may have on
ILC on

14 of the draft article of the

Responsibility precludes an injured state from using certain kinds of conduct by

countermeasures.
1.

other
State

way of

Article 14 reads thus:

An

injured state shall not resort, by

a)

The

threat or use

of force

[in

way of countermeasure,

to:

contravention of article 2, paragraph 4 of the

United Nations charter]

Any conduct

b)

(i)

is

which:

not in conformity with the rule of international law on the protection

of fiindamental human
(ii)

is

right;

serious prejudice to the normal operation bilateral or multilateral

diplomacy;
(iii) is

(iv)

contrary to a peremptory

obligations

if

it

constituting

As provided

Human

ILC

list,

its

human

article 14(l)(b)(I).

commentary on countermeasures:

rights

is

illegitimate

of nationals of the

immune from being

The view of the ILC on

subject to

the issue

179

the internationally wrongful act in question

LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIOANAL LAW,

571(1995).

of

law by the taking of

resorting to countermeasures

rights obligation are also excepted or

Even where
78

in the

act.

to prohibit the suspension

peremptory norms of international

of countermeasure under draft

reflected in

1

ILC endeavors

impacts or renders difficult the enjoyment of the

target state.

acts

which has committed the internationally wrongful

draft article 14 l(b)(iii), the

countermeasures.

international law;

consists of a breach of a obligation towards any state other than the
state

Under

norm of general

would

justify a

is

63
reaction involving the use of force, whatever the subject responsible for

applying

action taken

it,

in

guise certainly cannot include,

this

for

Such
a step could never be "legitimate" and such conduct would remain
HI 95I0O
instance, a breach of obligations of international humanitarian law.

^i.

The

WTongful.

some

issue attracted

Two

attention in Part

of the draft

articles

on State

Responsibility, and the proposal by Special Rapporteur Riphagen dealt with the issue of

which breached a peremptory norm of genera

illegitimacy of the conduct
181

law.

In his fourth report, he noted that the existence of rules of international law for

the protection of

human

objective regimes

1

rights "precluded reprisals"

which impose on

nationality of the person affected,

82

and asserted

states the respect

of human

that "there are other

right,

whatever the

and whatever the circumstances. Reprisals

such rules are obviously inadmissible, even

cnme.

international

if

in breach

of

they do not amount to an international

,,183

Professor Riphagen observed the following state responsibility in relation to jus

cogens:

An

internationally wrongful act of a state does not entail an obligation for

that state or a right for another state to the extent that the

performance of

would be incompatible with a
peremptory norm of general international law even if the same or another
peremptory norm of general international law permits such performance or
that obligation or the exercise of that right

exercise

I

so

'^'
1

82

'^^

UN
UN

Doc. AC/CN. 4/366/ Add.
Doc.

A/CN.

ELAGAB,
Id

4/354/ Add.

supra note 7 1

,

at

1

I,

2,

15 Apr. 1983, par.47,

May

1982, Para. 139,

at.

17.

at 11.

1

at 102.

See Riphagen,
4/354,

m that case.

May

TTiird report

1982, at 11.

on the Content, Forms and Degrees of State Responsibility, Doc. A/CN.
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The foregoing shows
contravention

to

countermeasure

is

that the taking

from

derogation

or

norms of human

the

Law

The Convention does not permit a

of a treaty by a state party so as

it

of Treaties

is

ahhough

law,

the

relevant in an examination of

party to suspend or withdraw the operation

can enforce international norms of

course, a suspension or withdrawal from a treaty obligation

general rule, if the treaty concerns the protection of a

Vienna Convention also

Article 42(2) of the

60(5).

rights

in

a legitimate consequence of a prior illegal act.

The Vienna Convention on
the issue.

of a countermeasure by an aggrieved party

prohibited

is

human

human
,

rights.

Of

as a matter of

person, pursuant to article

stipulates that the legal effect

of a

can be caused only in accordance with the applications of the treaty or the Vienna

treaty

Convention
stable

185

Such defined

itself.

legal

suspending

rule against suspension is necessary to establish a

regime of treaty law thus restricting the use of countermeasures by

Moreover,

treaties.

article

60(1)

of the Convention also

restricts

the

invocation of a material breach of another treaty in order to suspend the legal effect of a
separate treaty.

The wording of

the paragraph clearly suggests that "a state

terminate a treaty on the ground that a material breach of treaty
Article 60(5) of the

Vienna Convention on the

Law

may

not

B was committed"

of Treaties also provides an

exception to the rule set out under the foregoing subsection by providing that paragraphs

1

-3

of

article

60 do not apply to "provisions relating

to the protection

185

"The termination of a
result

treaty,

its

denunciation or the withdrawal of a party,

may

of human persons

take place only as a

of the application of the provisions of the treaty or the present Convention. The same rule applies to

suspension of the operation of a treaty." The Vienna Convention on the
art.42,

1

of Treaties,

May

23, 1969,

155 U.N.T.S. 331.

See also Theodore Meron

INT'L L. PROC.372, 374
'*S^.

Law

at

374-375.

et al.,

State Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83

(1989).

AM. SOC'Y
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contained in treaties of a humanitarian character, in particular to provisions prohibiting

any form of reprisals against persons protected by such

treaties"

This provision

precludes the suspension of any existing treaty obligation a means of countermeasure

such use

may have

a negative impact, on the

Since the 1960s, international

human

human
right

if

rights of individuals.

law has evolved

into

recognized legal

standards through convention, international custom and general principles of law.

Here, the obvious difficulty
as fundamental

the use of

rights,

human

is

rights.

to identify the international

norms

that

may be

categorized

With such a designation, one could judge whether or not

economic sanctions would

on the norms of fundamental htiman

directly impact

even when certain groups of rights are enforced

at the

expense of others.

Although the exception made by the ILC prohibits the taking of counter-measures

which have an impact on the protection of fundamental human
of views on what constitutes fundamental

human

rights.

basis of their significance to individuals and the

rights, there is a difference

If rights are

community

at

weighted on the

large, the taking

countermeasures through the use of economic sanctions should be prohibited.

measures make the protection of some basic economic rights such as the right
right to

work

difficult or at

times impossible to

Economic sanctions may be used
are said to constitute the pillars

of

Such

to food, the

attain.

and

to enforce the civil

and being preemptive of

all

political rights,

which

other kinds of rights.

Sanctions to promote civil and political rights have an indispensable ramification on the
exercise of social and economic rights of the population of the target state, rights which
are obviously understood as being

1

07

The Vienna Convention on

the

Law of Treaties, May

ISC

ELAGAB,

supra note

more fundamental and preemptive

70, at 101.

23, 1969, art.42,

1

in the developing

155 U.N.T.S. 331.

66

Economic sanctions

world.

suspends a
affecting

state's

can, in other words, be taken as a countermeasure that

obligation to promote the respect of universal or multilateral treaties

economic and

social rights.

Because some of economic and social human rights are indeed fundamental, then
the

of unilateral economic measures that violate the observance of such

exercise

economic and

social rights

would go contrary

to the

enjoyment of these

human

sanction creates a great impediment on the realization of

economic

national of the target state to

defaulting state to

treaties

and other related

comply with

its

human

means of

success.

population of the target

The immediate

state,

by exposing the

rights

the suspension or termination of

treaties,

even

if

designed to coerce a

right obligations, is not, therefore, legitimate.

The imposition of economic sanctions supposes
the sole

the ensuing suffering of

target

whose economic

human

of economic sanction
suffering and chaos

is

is

withdraw or denounce a

economic sanction against another

Some
in a

manner

practical illustrations

that

was more or

population of the target country.

1

89

For instance, trade embargoes

disrupting the

economy of the

or financial sanctions,

may have

may

beings as

the innocent

anticipated to

coerce a change of government or influence the leaders to alter their policies.
right of a state to suspend,

Economic

deteriorations.

The imposition of economic sanction through
economic and trade

rights.

treaty for the purpose

Thus

the

of imposing

state is restricted.

may

less

be cited in which economic sanctions were used

compatible to the needs of the victims innocent

When

France retaliated in

restrict the target's

target country.

May

1979 against the Central

access to both export market and import markets,

Investment and capital sanctions,

similarly cause significant

the long-term impact of shrinking the

economic damage

working

in the

form of disinvestment

to the target state.

Disinvestment

capital stock in the target country which, in turn,

causes the transfer of capital from the target country. Financial sanctions also produce a quantity constraint

of foreign exchange as a result of the

target's inability to access significant sources

KAEMPFER & LOWERBERG, supra note

8, at

65-80.

of foreign exchange. See

67
African Republic for the massacre of 85 young people by Bokassa's security forces by

suspending

its

financial cooperation agreement with the regime,

measure financial assistance

it

exempted from the

Needed

of education, food and medicine.

in the areas

commodities were also excluded from an embargo when the United States imposed a
total

blockade of trade relations in 1986 against Libya by way of countermeasure. In

action, the

US embargoed

this

the export to Libya of any goods, technology or services from

the United States except publications and donations of articles intended to relieve

human

suffering such as food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for

medical purposes.

191

Economic sanctions meant

to

promote

civil

and

political rights that

take effect through the suspension of social and economic rights in the target state

through the suffering of its civilian population are illegitimate.

C.

The Concept
The

of State Responsibility' for

issue of state responsibility for

been subject

to scholarly scrutiny.

Human

human

it.

But the issue

calls forth a

principles of international law.

See generally Theodore Meron,

It is

an area that has

rights violations is not

The invocation of state

violations has not been a focus of discussion

with

Rights Violations

among

number of

human

rights

few have

dealt

responsibility for

scholars and only

difficult questions

surroundmg the

with good reason that one has to seek the relationship

On a Hierarchy of International Human

Rights, 80

AM.

J.

INT'L L. 1-

10(1986).
191
'^'

192

Id
International lawyers have not

relation to the general

law

Of state

made

a sound effort to discuss the enforcement of human rights in

responsibility.

Few,

to the responsibility that the defaulting state incurs.

Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 83 Proc.

Theodore Meron
can be exploiated

,

if

any, have investigated

See Theodore Meron

Am.

& M.

human

rights in reference

McCarthy, State

Soc't Int'L L. 372(1989).

for example, advances the idea that the relation of state responsibility to
in

a

manner important

to the field

of human rights law. See

Id.

human

rights

68

between the law of human
his general course

rights

on public

and

that

of

law

international

Judge Lachs remarked

state responsibihty.

at the

Hague Academy of

in

International

Law:

The question of

international responsibility for violation of

among jurists.

has been the subject of lively discussion

law

may

be

does

from principles generally accepted, while the obligations inserted

in a

of each nation's commitment

contained regimes whereby the violation of

human

human

of the treaty by invoking the laws of

remedy of human

rights obligations

human

state responsibility.

mainly "sanctionless"'

rights mostly lack

An

attempt to restrain the

the treaty,

would render

because international obligation in the

an enforcement mechanism.

Simma

argues that any

which advocates the pursuance of the available remedies within the human

treaty itself,

would render

the international treaties pertaining to

"quality lower" than those of other kinds of treaties.

latter

rights treaties are self-

remedy may be sought outside

mechanisms provided under

rights within the

'^^.

rights can be addressed only through

the procedure provided with the treaty itself or whether the

thesis

In the light of the

far reaching, resulting as

His remarks addressed the question of whether

area of

rights

it

in force, this responsibility

treaty are subject to the limits

human

human

case one can rely on diplomatic

human

rights

rights at a

In addition, he argues that "in a

means of enforcement, on

the various procedures of

dispute settlement and in the last instance, on the self-help by peaceful means, while with
respect

'^^

to

human

rights

treaties

one

would have

to

remain

content

with

pure

RCADI (1980)Vol.IV, at 70.
RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FORTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 279-280(1989).
M. Lachs, General Course

'^^

'^V^.

at

281.

in

Public International Law, 169

69
'stimulation.'

This vividly describes the problem inherent in the law of human rights

".

lack of self-contained regime.

The paper recognizes

the

power of

countermeasures including that of economic sanctions to enforce
states

are responding to another states violation of international

The Notion of Injured
It

is

State

departs on

how

rights.

Law

important to have a clear understanding of the notion of an injured state

equated with the term, "directly injured state," and
"indirectly injured state,"

has suffered injury to
to describe states

its

which describes a
"legal interests."

The term, "injured

is

is

contrasted with the designation,

has sustained no material injury but

state that

Dupuy

state,"

uses the term, "directly injured states,"

which have incurred subjective or personal damage as a consequence of

commission of a crime.

interests

law of human

and Third Party Remedy under International

before considering the concept of state responsibility.

the

It

can resort to measures where the wrong doing does not directly affect their interest

when they

1

.

states to resort to

"Indirectly injured states" are states

have not undergone any particular harm

their

to

interest,

whose objective
but which are

"nevertheless directly concerned, by the fact that an obligation ignored attacks the public

order of the international

community

to

which they belong."

credibility to the notion that responsibility is

In

modem

international

international wrongful act

is

evoked

201

The

in the context

law, whether only

a

of human

directly

state

entitled to resort to responsive

latter definition

lends

rights.

affected

by the

measures or whether

third

199
Id.

^°°

PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY, IMPLICATIONS OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES, in International Crimes of State: A critical anaysis

Draft article 19 on State Responsibility I79(Joseph H.H. Weiler
^°'/c/.at 179-180.

et a!.,

1989)

oflLC'S

70
20")

states

may

sanction-imposing state must be the injured state

Consequently, the definition of "injured state"
poses a

"

take action on the delinquent state are debatable issues.

When

critical question.

contravention of

its

is

unclear in international law.

is

directly pertinent to

a state violates the

international

Whether or not the

human

rights

of

human

its

law obligations, obvious questions

This

is

The

are evident.

which considered

first

human

rights.

At

this juncture,

law "there

is

one or many subjects of international law.

207

^^^

See

take a

two approaches

In other words,

and must be exercised against

In this case,

when

a certain international

breached, one state or group of states can be considered to be injured in their

When

rights.

who can

always a correlation between the

international responsibility does not "exist in abstracto"

is

as a

Law Commission,

obligation of one subject and the subjective right of another."

obligation

community

203

approach was supplied by the International

that in international

which

states.

a relevant discussion in relation to the issue of whether

response for the breaches of the laws of

it

nationals in

arise as to

subjects of international law suffer injury- whether the international

whole or only the nationals of the breaching

own

rights, as

a certain multilateral

MALANCZUK, supra note

1

human

right treaty is infringed, the defaulting state

72, at 230.

Third party remedy was molded into a concrete legal concept by the attempts of the international

Court of Justice to introduce erga omnes obligations
Barcelona Traction, Light and power
International

Company

commission of Jurists concerning

State Responsibility,

YB. Of the

International

in the

Ltd., ICJ

Barcelona Traction Case( Case Concerning the

Reports at 33, para.33(1970). and by that of the

international crimes(See Article 19

Law

Commission(1976)vol.II, Part

of the Draft Articles on

2, P. 95 et seq.,

.

And

also

See Hans Van Houtte, International Legal Aspects of Economic Sanction, at 152. The root of these norms
germinates from a similar flow of thinking that certain norms are "of overriding value and importance to
all
^^'^

actors in international relations" and the reach of these rules

See

KAMMWG A, supra note

151, at 162.

'''id
^'^

^^^
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YB Int'L L. Comm'n., Part II, at 76.
KAMMINGA, 5M/7ra note 151, at 163-164.

(1976) 2

,

,

^

,

,

Id. at 164.

is

of a series nature. Id

71

may owe

an obligation to

states,

all

depending on whether the breached obligation

belongs to a norm having erga omnes character.

do characteristically establish "obligations
208

The second approach

states."

is

Such

that run

multilateral

human

rights treaties

from each party toward

that the state or states that are injured

all

other

by the breach of

the international obligation can obtain a remedy, but "subjects not injured in their rights

This precludes the taking of any measure by any

cannot bring an international claim."
state

which has not suffered an infringement of its subjective
For instance,

the

in the case

Vienna Convention on the

breach to invoke

may

be between

it

as a

itself

210

rights

of a breach of a multilateral

Law

treaty. Article 60(2)(b)

of Treaties allows a party particularly affected by a

ground for suspending the treaty as a whole or

and the defaulting

state.

in part, as the case

This precludes other states not particularly

affected from unilaterally suspending a treaty in response to the breach.

concern

is

demand

the issue of whether or not states can unilaterally

The term "injured

state"

of

does not appear to

set a limitation

on the

effective countermeasures for certain kinds of violations.

Of immense

third party remedies.

ability

of states to take

This doctrine has a firm

foundation these days with the growing concession that states not directly and materially
affected have a right to a pursue

remedy under

Third party remedy holds that third

international law.

states,

which

are not materially affected,

may

respond to certain serious violations of international law having great importance.

These

third state remedies evolved

mainly

after

World War

II.

213

The United Nations

'''id. ax 165.
'''
Id.

See Jonathan

I.

Chamey, Third state Remedies

(1989).
213

See

ELAGAB, supra note

71, at 58.

in International

Law, 10 Mich.

J.

INT'L. L.

57, 59

72
Charter recognized a role for collective remedy in respect to breaches of international

Through the Security Council, the United Nations may take

peace and security.

enforcement action against the breaching

and the enforcing

state,

states

of such a

resolution need not have a direct vested interest in the matter.

commonly accepted

Contrary to the
international

third state

law are available

to states that

remedy by a non-injured

Under

certain circumstances.

may have

entitled all states "to take all reasonable

to prevent

what they can

The

to their legal interest,

state

can be sought under

government held

and legitimate steps as

such an occurrence, and either individually or by

to ensure that judgment... is

Law

that Albania's

Corfu Channel

may

common

action to do

of Treaties

remedy law was extensively
.In its

See Chamey, supra note 2 1

Chamey, supra note

21

1,

1

,

dealt

consideration of third state

remedy, the ILC has clearly and significantly defined the concept of an injured

215

be open to

duly implemented and carried out."

issue of the right of a third state to legal

with in the ILC's draft work on the

214

by the

remedy under

the right to seek a

to the decision against her in the

217

them

remedies under public

certain situations, a state not materially injured

damages contrary

reluctance to pay
case,

wrongdoing

In a case before the ICJ, the British

international law.

that

had sustained damage

state against a

behavior of the wrongdoing state

illegal

view

traditional

state.

The

at 63.

at 59. Despite this

general rule of international law, a long established

opinion holds that third states are considered injured parties

in

cases of grave breaches of international law

concerning matters of great importance. Id
^'^

/^.at 59-61.

217

See Corfu Channel
218

,

Merits, Judgment,

ICJ reports, 1949,

IdaX 5S(Citing the Case of the Monetary Gold

at 36.

Removed From Rome

in

1943, ICJ pleading, 1954, at

126.

The content of this statement
publicists.

See

ELAGAB,

The Report of the

Comm.,

1972,

at

asserting the right of third states to take reprisals has been

supra note,

International

226-229.

sustained

many

at 58.

Law Commission on

the

Work of its

18th session (1966), 2 Y.B,

Intfil

73

ILC defined

characteristics of the injured state for the purpose of responsibility involving

the breach of multilateral treaties or

1

.

norms of international customary law:

For the purpose of the present
right

of which

constitutes,

infringed by the act of another

is

accordance

in

"injured state"

article,

with

part

I

of the

means any
state,

present

state a

if that

act

articles,

an

internationally wrongful act of that state.
2.

In particular, "injured state" means:
(a)

If the right infringed

(b)

If the right infringed

by the

act

of a

from a

state arises

bilateral treaty, the

other state party to the treaty;

by the

from a judgment or other

act of a state arises

binding dispute settlement decision of an international court or tribunal,
the other state or states parties to the dispute and entitled to the benefit of
that right;

(C) If the right infringed by the act of a state arises from a binding decision of

an international organ other than an international court or tribunal, the
state or states

which, in accordance with the constituent instrument of the

international organization concerned, are entitled to the benefit of that
right;

If the right infringed

(d)

by the act of a

state arises fi-om

a treaty provision for

a third state, that third state;
If the right infringed

(e)

by the act of a

state arises

from multilateral

treaty or

from a rule of customary international law, any other state party to the
bound by the relevant rule of customary international

multilateral treaty or

law, if
(I)
(ii)

it

is

established that:

The right has been created or is established in its favor
The infringement of the right by the act of a state

necessarily

enjoyment of the right or the performance of the

affected the

obligation of the other states parties to the multilateral treaty or

bound by

the rule of customary international law: or

(iii)The right has

human

been created or

rights

If the right infringed

(f)

any other party

is

established for the protection of

and fundamental freedom.

by the

act

of

state arises

to the multilateral treaty, if

from a multilateral

it is

treaty,

established that the right

has been expressly stipulated in that treaty for the protection of the
collective interests of the states parties thereto.
3.

In addition, an "injured state" means,

constitutes

if the

an international crime [and in the context of the rights and

obligations of states under articles 14 and 15],

220

(1985) 2

YB

Int'l L.

The concept of the

internationally wrongful act

Comm'n,

injured state,

Part

II,

was not

all

other states.

at 25.

enthusiastically received

by the sixth committee of the General

74

Thus, the ILC, in

which

treaties,

its

definition of an "injured state," includes parties to bilateral

are entitled to the benefit of the binding decision of a dispute settlement

tribunal or organ, as well as third states that are beneficiaries of treaty obligations.

ILC

of "injured states" indicates that they are designated as beneficiaries of certain

list

legal obligations that

may

par. 3.

It is

be transgressed, except the notion of "injured state" which

human

defined in reference to

interest

rights in par. 2(e)(iii)

could be considered to be an injured

[rules

of par.

2(e)(iii)

and

that

state.

The

of international law concerning the obligation of

and fundamental freedoms] are not allocatable

The other area of

third state

direct injury to

legal

its

Law Commission

International

by underlying

that "[t]he interests protected

states to respect

human

rights

222

to a particular state."

remedy which

is

very important to this paper

considered under the ILC draft concerning the provisions dealing international crimes.

The ILC developed a cogent doctrine
responsibility,

which

in

to the

delegates felt that the definition failed to distinguish

those that

art.

19(2) of the

draft

stated that the protection of certain obligations

Assembly. Although some delegations agreed

above definition of "injured
between a

state that

have sustained an indirect one. Moreover, these delegates

expressed their opinion that

article 5

states that

had been

article

is

state"

who were

critical

in

directly injured.

on

is

223

state

so essential and

by the ILC, most

has sustained a direct

should cover only the former category and

extreme remedies should only be available to

is

of international crimes under

which sustained no

explicitly provided that a state

further elaborated the nature

by

The

damage and

about the issue

any case, the more
See

KAMMINGA,

at

169-170.
221

^^^
223

See Chamey, supra note 212,
(1985) 2

A

YB

Int'l L.

at 80.

Comm'n,

part

II,

at 25.

separate provision has been provided under the draft code on state responsibility of the

ILC

to define

what constitutes international crime, one of which covers serious violation of certain norms of human
rights.

It

thus reads:

3. ..an

international crime

may

result, inter alia,

from: a serious breach on a

widespread scale of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being,
such as those prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid. See Doc. A/CN.4/L. 524, June 21, 1996,

at 14.

75

The

fundamental that their breach constitutes an international crime.

draft states that

the term "injured state" refers to "all other states" if the internationally wrongful act

"constitutes an international crime."

third states

'"^

This also stands as the exception to the rule that

which are not tangibly injured by a breach of international law carmot

legally

resort to remedial action.

Even more important
that

an "injured state" which suffered no direct harm

resolved
for

for the purpose of this paper is the inclusion in the definition

its

is

whether or not a

is

entitled to a

state is entitled to unilaterally

commission of an internationally wrongful

remedy.

Still to

respond against another

act constituting a breach of

its

be

state

human

rights obligations.

such

Since

norm

international

a

in the area,

it

that

treaties

an

create

could any of the parties to a multilateral convention
left it

with no material damage?

possible for states to resort to unilateral countermeasures to vindicate the interest of

the international

community and take

the violation of

human

imposing

Although the

state.

rights in

The scope of paragraph

2(e)(iii) is

the

human

wide

law

own hands? More

into their

often than not,

one country does not directly affect the sanctionof a third

interest

indispensable; thus, the law of

224

multilateral

remedy even when the violation

unilaterally resort to a

Is

would breach

violation

state

may be remote

or absent,

it

is

rights is effectively enforced through third state

in the

sense that

it

deals with

human

rights

and fundamental

freedom, as compared to a narrower reference to international obligation of essential importance for
safeguarding the

Commission or

human

being, as endorsed in the definition of international crime by the International

human personapplied

Law

famous dicta of the
International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case. In other words, the ILC established a norm
embracing the notion of a wider scope than is found in the human rights obligations which are defined as
the notion of basic rights of the

having erga omnes character

in

the Barcelona Traction case

KAMMINGA, supra note

1 ,

at

225

1

5

1

by the

68.

Riphagen, Sixth Report, Doc.A/CN. 4/389, April

2,

1985, at 6.

in

ICJ.

the

ICJ Reports (1970)

at 32.

See also

76

The

remedies.

by

dictate action

state.

violation of international

third states, in spite

The puzzle

is in

rights

may

generate a legal interest and

of the intangible nature of the

how

determining

human

this

remedy should be

interest

exercised.

of the other

Should

it

be

exercised unilaterally or collectively?
In the Nicaragua Case, the court attempted to address the illegitimacy of resorting
to a unilateral third party

remedy

for the

enforcement of human rights

in a separate

paragraph from the one that contained the concept of erga omnes obligations.

read as

It

follows:

However, on the universal
rights

level, the

do not confer on the

instruments which

embody human

infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality.
still

on the regional

of

state the capacity to protect the victims

level that a solution to this

It is

therefore

problem has had

be

to

sought; thus, within the Council of Europe..., the problem of admissibility

encountered by the claim

European Convention on
a

party

to

the

has been resolved by the

in the present case

Human

convention

to

Rights,

which

lodge

a

each

entitles

state

which

complaint against any

is

other

contracting state for the violation of the convention, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim.

As
interests

human

is

indicated in this paragraph, the ICJ did not intend to entitle a state

were not

directly affected to take a measure.

rights treaties, including the

entitlement to seek any unilateral
227

State.

Where

the

human

nationals, the interest of

necessarily

Military
^^^

more

no other

In other words, parties to universal

Human

is

state is particularly affected,

and "no single

its

own

state is

228

state."

and Against Nicaragua, ICJ

5w/7ra note 151, at 154-155.

act of the breaching

perpetrated by a state agamst

by the breach than any other

in

Rights, do not have a legal

remedy against the wrongful

rights violation

and Paramilitary Activities

KAMMINGA,
Id. at 66.

affected

Covenant of

whose

Therefore, "all states

Reports, 1986.

77

bound by the obligation
state

are equally injured

by the breach."

Consequently, no single

should be entitled to claim a remedy, and such a measure should be carried out

through a collective means of enforcement.

Most

on

writers

third state remedies

do not support a wide use of

this

remedy.

Akehurst, for example, applies the idea of third state remedies to only three areas, namely
the enforcement of judicial decisions, breaches of multilateral agreements and violations

He

of rules prohibiting the use of force.
reprisals

on the ground

that such

23

Tunkin,

international relations.

stands firm in his disapproval of third state

remedies would be more harmful than beneficial to

who

the leading Soviet expert

on international law,

similarly insists that third state remedies be circumvented to breaches of peace, threats to

breach

peace,

the

colonialism.

of aggression, war crimes,

acts

Meron

subjects obligation having erga

crimes

omnes

against

humanity and

character to third states

remedies and argues that international laws of human rights have an

Although the ILC work on the law of State Responsibility

attribute.

is

the

main document

advocating a wider support of third state remedies, this source also sets limits on
third party

more

remedy should be

exercised.

The recent approach of

by adopting a narrower scope

restricted application

character and by limiting the use of third state

229

,

,

,

remedy

to

to the

the

how

ILC suggests a

norms having an erga omens
commission of international

^^

Id.al 167.

230

See Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States. 44
231

See Chamey, supra note 2 1

1

,

233

Int'l.

L.

1,

15-16 (1970).

Law 415.425 (1974))
RIGHTS LAW MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS LAW,

Tunkin, Theory of International

THEODORE MERON, HUMAN

12(1986)
234

Y. B.

at 75.

232
G.l.

Brit.

Chamey, supra note 2

1

1 ,

at 78.

II-

78
235

crimes.

•

Most importantly,

,

it

was emphasized

that

such a remedy must be imposed by

The view

a collective decision or authorized by the same.

that a third state

remedy

should be exercised by collective decision and by an international organization will be

pursued

in detail.

A

unilateral

creates a situation

economic sanction upon

whereby powerful

states

breaching norms of

states

become

omnes

condemns

rights

"self-appointed policemen" without

any kind of judicial or multilateral determination of the case.
strongly

human

Professor Graefrath

the use unilateral countermeasures for violations of norms having erga

character or for international crimes as follows:

From being faced with an international crime or another
omnes obligation, it does not, however, follow that every

violation of erga
state not directly

affected apart from or independently, of the decisions of the Security

Council, would have the right to apply individually sanctions exceeding

what

He

is

called 'unfriendly measures'.

reasons that using sanctions as pretexts to justify intervention in other states

would undermine the

role

of international law.

238

Despite the significance of third party

remedies for the enforcement of

human

economic sanctions

because the injury

international

is

restricted

community and not any

should be sought. Moreover,

235

it is

rights, their unilateral exercise in

is

a form of

supposedly sustained by the

particular state; therefore, a universal

remedy

not ever desirable for a state to claim enforcement of an

See Sixth Report on the Content, Forms and Decree of International Responsibility (Part 2 of the Draft

Articles),

by Willem Riphagen, Special Reporter (1985) 2(1) Y.B.

Int'l. L.

Commn

3, 5-8,

UN

Doc.

A/CN. 41,389.
'''
237

Id
Bernard Graefrath, Responsibility and damages caused: Relationship between responsibility and

damages, 185 Recueil des cours
^^^/^.at68.

9, at

67-68 (1984-11).

79
obligation erga

omnes and then

attribute international responsibility

on a

state

which

it

thinks has breached the norm, for such conduct will likely produce chaos in international
relations.

The

application

unacceptable, since a state

of

may

this

economic measure

totally

is

well abuse the right and thus injure another state by

when such

taking "remedial" action

type of unilateral

a step

is

neither justified nor necessary.

239

Third state remedies should therefore be used either by the international community
as

a

whole

through

the

collective

decision-making

process

of an

international

organization or through the authorization of the same. This does not presuppose a breach
to a tangible right

which

of any

reflects the interest

state but

only to the legal right of the international community

of the international community. The community

respond to the violation through a collective decision-making process.

economic

sanctions

enforcing

for

international organizations.

239

See Chamey, supra note 21

1

,

at 87.

human

rights

should

only

be

at large

should

Consequently,
sought

through

CHAPTER V
THE LEGALITY OF USING COLLECTIVE

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE HUMAN RIGHTS
As a

unilaterally to enforce a

human

multilateral

does

it

human

human

mean

that

rights.

As

right obligations

it

is

take

rights violation is not justifiable, for the reasons seen in

However,

foregoing discussion.

the

may

general rule, an economic sanction that a state or a group of states

this

does not mean that a

state

breaching

its

under international law will go unchallenged. Nor

not possible to apply state responsibility for the enforcement of

Professor Frowlein so aptly stated,

"Human

rights guarantees

which

cannot be protected by some action, however weak, are not worth the ink with which they
•^

,,240

are written.

A.

Human

Rights Having a Peremptory

and Erga Omnes Character and Those Constituting International Crimes
Certain

human

international law.

classified

all

right

norms have acquired a

special status under

Unlike the traditional notion of international legal system which

norms of

international

law under a uniform

legal

regime,

240
J. A.

Human

Frowlein, The interrelationship between the Helsinki Final Act, the International
Rights,

and the European Convention on Human

Rights, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD
241

Some have

contemporary

criticized the classification

HUMAN RIGHTS

modem

Law Covenant on

,

71-75(Thomas Buergenthel, ed.,1977)

of some kinds of human rights into a special category as an

attempt to disregard the doctrine of state sovereignty by envisaging a "wider, state-transcending interest of

an undifferentiated international community." See
Totalitarian Instrument, 14 South Africa

Ha Strydom, Jus Cogens: Peremptory Norm

Yearbook of

International

80

Law, 42 (1989).

or

81

jurisprudence incorporates the concept of hierarchical norms
"

domestic legal system.
"ordinary"

,

as the

one known

in the

Certain norms should be placed at a "higher" level than
obligations

international

because

of their

importance

special

the

to

'^

community.

international

In order to distinguish

more important
similar

but

more important human

rights

rights are categorized either as having erga

not

identical

labels,

from

omnes

less important ones,

character or as having

such as "jus cogens," "non-derogable rights" or

This had resulted in the final emergence of the concepts of

"international crimes."

"International crimes of states," "erga omnes," and "jus cogens."

'

Article 103 of the

UN

Charter and the concept of non-derogable rights are also other references of normative
values acquiring supreme status.

Generally, the difference between the concept of jus

cogens, obligation having an erga omnes character and international crimes
technical.

from other wrongful

responsibility, the idea

The

theor>'

of erga omnes

244

J. Int'l

strictly

and exclusively limited

to the latter

norms".

248

Legal Stud. 81, 81(1996).

Id

ILC'S

in

DRAFT ARTICLE

See also Meron,

Omnes

and Jus Cogens: Tentative Analysis of Three
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

G. Gaja, Obligations Erga

Related Concepts,

^"^^

is

both on the ground of the special regime of

See Antti Korkeakivi, Consequences of Higher International Law: Evaluating Crimes of State and

Erga Omnes, 2
'''

acts,

of jus cogens posits the possible limits on the contractual freedom of

states attempting to override "higher

242

very

While the concept of international crime begins with the distinction between

international crimes

part.

is

On The

19

KAMMINGA, 5Mpra note

ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
151, at 157.

Korkeakivi, supra note 242,
/^. at

81-82.

^'^^.at82.

International Crimes

Hierarchy of International

246
247

,

at

81

Human

151-160(1989).

Rights, 80

Am.

J.

Int'L L.l 0-1 3(1

986).

82
1.

Perempton- norms

The concept of jus cogens,

also

known

norms of

as the peremptor>'

law, has been defined under article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
in the following

A

international

Law

of Treaties

way:

treaty is void

if,

at the

time of

conclusion,

its

peremptory norm of general international law.

it

conflicts with a

For the purposes of the

norm of general international law is a
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
present Convention, a peremptory

Emphasizing the universal character of peremptory norms, the International

Commission

stated: "It

would seem contradictory

if,

in the case

Law

of breach of a rule so

important to the entire international community as to be described as 'peremptor>',' the
relationship of responsibihty

was established

the breach and the state directly injured by

solely
250

it."

between the

peremptory effect

is

character.

Although the

which committed

Thus a violation of a peremptory norm

constitutes a breach of the legal interest of the international

norms of erga omnes

state

set

community,

like that

of

of rules of human rights having

not clearly defined, prohibitions against genocide, slavery and racial

discrimination and those rights which constitute part of customary international law are
frequently cited as examples of
that these kind

human

rights constituting jus cogens.

249 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
^^'

could be seen

of human rights are similar no those human rights having an erga omnes

character.

^^^

It

[1976] 2 Y.B.lnt'l. L.

Comm'n,

KAMMINGA, 5wpra note

102.

151, at 158.

May

28, 1969,

1

155 U.N.T.S.331.
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2.

Human

Rights as International Crimes.

human

Other violations of

rights

they, too, need further clarification.

The

may be

categorized as "international crimes";

classification

of certain groups of human rights

violations as international crimes originated during the codification of the

articles

on

252

dealt under article 19, part

1

The concept of

state responsibility.

An

act

of a

draft

was extensively

and was defined as follows:

I,

state

international crime

ILC

which constitutes a breach on an international obligation

is

an

internationally wrongful act, regardless of the subject matter of the obligation

breached.
2.

An

which

internationally wrongful act

from the breach of any

results

of

state

an obligation essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the
international

community
3.

community

that

breach

its

is

recognized as a crime by that

as a whole, constitutes an international crime.

Subject to paragraph two, and on the basis of the rules of international law in
force, an international
(a)

crime

may

result, inter alia,

from:

a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the

maintenance

of international

peace

and

security,

such

as

that

prohibiting aggression;
(b)

a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the right of self-determination of peoples, such as that prohibiting the

establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination;

(C) a serious breach on a widespread scale of an international obligation of
essential importance for safeguarding the

human

being, such as those

prohibiting slavery, genocide and apartheid;
(d)

a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for
the safeguarding and preservation of the

human environment, such

as

those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the high seas.
4.

Any

internationally wrongful

accordance with paragraph

act

which

2, constitutes

is

not an international crime in

an international

253

delict.

2^2

The concept of international crimes was contained
International

Law Commission

in

1976 and

it

253. Also see Korkeaviki, supra note 242, at 82-83.

[1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.

Comm'n,

95-96.

in the

Draft article 19 on state responsibility by the

was adopted unanimously. [1976]

1

Y.B.

Int'l L.

Comm'n

84

The

of international crime under paragraph
paragraph:

of human rights violations in the family

draft explicitly includes certain kinds

first,

depending on

a

its

human

Two

3(c).

rights violation

is

degree of importance:

points can be deduced from the

classified as an international crime if

second,

the

should

violation

be

it

serious,

systematic and carried out on a wide scale.
3.

Human

Rights Having an Erga

Omnes

The concept of erga omnes

is

Character.

basically concerned with questions of

invoke responsibility for international crimes.
traditional

view under

international

law

who may

This concept runs contrary to the

that only the

wrongdoing

state

and the

state

victim of the wrongdoing are involved in the issue international responsibility for the

wrongful

whom

Such a

act.

bilateralist

an international obligation

This was gradually changed to a
has. ...two types

approach gave
is

due can bring a claim

new regime whereby "any

of injury: injury to the target

state

The underlying question concerning

who

""*

rise to the idea that

and injury

in respect

"only the party to

of

its

breach."

257

violation of international law
258

to the public order."

the obligation erga

omnes revolves around

has the right to respond in case of the breaches of such norms: a unilateral third state

KAMMINGA,

5Mpra note 151,atl60.

Korkeakivi, supra note 242,

at 96.

257

Case of Reparation For
258

Mahnoush H.

Injuries Suffered in Service

Arsanjani, The Codification of the

PROC. 225,247(1989).
Many authorities agree that

all

of the United Nations, 1949

Law of State Responsibility,

AM. SOC'Y INT'L

L.

customary human rights norms constitute obligation erga omnes. See

OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW

IN

THEORY AND PRACTICE

The Restatement(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the American Law Institute
that customary international law of human rights creates obligations by each state
so that violation by a state of the rights of persons subject to
other states.

83

I.C.J. 174.

its

jurisdiction

is

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,

,

342-44(1991).

for

example

stipulates

to all states(erga

omnes)

a breach of obligation to

S.70I (1987).

all

85
not directly or
to obtain, the

all states

argument

Although a consensus

through a collective measure.
tilts

towards the support of the

latter.

is

not easy

Unilateral acts have usually

been criticized as increasing international tension, and as one observer described
risk

"the

of making an improper use of counter-measures can not be discarded, but the

may

alternative

well be that

common

The rapporteur of

by law."

institutional nature

ILC have

the

community

Such view find

reaction."

of international society are not protected

at different

times articulated the idea of the

its

all states,

but

of the right of

basis in the rationale of the argument that "since third

interest, the

community

interest finally concretizes

in question

should respond
is

an "abstract"

through an international institution which

has a universal character, in other words the United Nations.
that the

not

Since the idea of international community

collectively to the breach."

community

"it is

that is envisaged as a possible bearer

enforcement reflects community

one, the

interests

of erga omnes obligations by asserting that

rather the international

state

it,

It

has even been agreed

United Nations has the power of representing the international community when

issues of "maintenance of the peace" so requires. Accordingly, the former rapporteur of

the ILC, Riphagen wrote that "the organized international community, that

is

the United

Nations Organization, has a role to play in determining the special legal consequences
entailed

security

by
is

even

[international crime],

if the

maintenance of international peace and

not considered to be involved"

760

See Korkeakivi, supra note 242,
Gaja, supra note 244,

at 102.

at 156.

7ft7

Robert Ago, Obligations Erga

Omnes and the

RESPONSIBILITY

238(

J.

Weiler

Chamey, supra note 212,

et al.,

at 92.

264

Korkeakivi, supra note 242,

^"

[1982J2 Y.B.

Int'l. L.

at 103.

Comm'n

48.

1989).

INTERNATIONAL
DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE

International Community, in

CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

ILC'S

86

The enforcement of these norms
as supported by the ICJ

are left to a great extent to third state remedies,

In an often quoted dictum of the Barcelona Traction

itself.

case, the ICJ upheld third state remedies for enforcement of erga

An

omnes

obligations:

drawn between the obligation of the
community as a whole, and those arising

essential distinction should be

state

towards the international

vis-a-vis another state in the field of diplomatic protection.

nature, the former are the concern of all states.

of the rights involved,

all states

can be held to

By

their very

view of the importance
have a legal interest in their
In

protection: they are obligation Erga Omnes...

such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law,
fi-om the outlawing of acts of aggression

principle

and rules concerning the basic

rights of protection
law..., others are

and of genocide, as also from the

rights... some

of the corresponding

have entered into the body of general international

conferred by international instruments of a universal or

quasi-universal character.

In this case, the ICJ indicated that

collective interest in the international

of

interest

states in the protection

obligations refer to those particular
create a duty

community

on a

state

some kinds of

obligations give rise to a

community and hence

it

recognizes the legal

of the breaches of obligation erga omnes.

norms under

international law,

vis-a-vis another contracting state,

Such

which do not merely

but to the international

as a whole.

This does not however

mean

that unilateral

measures

is

completely ruled out.

One

exception

where

unilateral

omnes

obligations. This idea, implicated by the decision of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction

measures by

third states

maintained by the ILC confirms the

is

allowed

is

in the

case of judicial remedies for violation of erga

fact that third states are entitled to

Case and

seek responsibility from breaches of

omnes obligations through proper judicial channels. [1976] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 99, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 47SER.4/ 1976/Add.l(part 2) Although it was initially declared by the ICJ that the concept of actio
popularis is not known in international law in the South West Africa cases, the court acknowledged the
erga

existence of the right in the international legal system at the Barcelona Traction case. Bring the Ethiopian
citation

and case here.

266

Chamey, supra note 2
^^^

See ICJ Reports, 1970,

268

,

,

Id. at

269

,

,

__
32.

1

2, at 62.
at 32.
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The Barcelona Traction case

human

human

identified certain

rights as being intrinsic to

owed

values and classified violations of these rights as obligations

international

community

as a whole.

an erga omnes character

is

Nevertheless, the

not exhaustive since there

list

is

to

the

of those human rights having
only a partial mention of the

prohibition of aggression and "those principles and rules concerning the basic rights of
the

human

person, including protection from slaver>' and racial discrimination."

obligations in the sphere of

human

Other

rights are also regarded as having erga

omnes

character.

It is

omnes

evident that the enumeration of both those

human

rights

norms having erga

character and those that can be labeled as international crimes are non- exhaustive

and mainly limited

to

human

an exhaustive and definitive

rights of a similar nature.

list

Although

it

is difficult

of this type of violation, most persons will agree that the

practice of systematic torture can be classified as an international crime.

some norms of human
designating certain

in

West African

cases.

is

Moreover,
protection by

no derogation, be

The common thread

situations.

the Barcelona Traction case

court held in the South

human

standards of

rights as inviolable, allowing

war or public emergency

The statement

minimum

rights set certain

human

to derive

in

it

in

time of

definitions

all

of

an evolution as well as a reversal from the stance that the

In 1970, four years before the

famous dictum

in the

Barcelona

Traction case, the court held that Ethiopia and Liberia did not have either a legal right or an interest to
institute a

claim against South Africa for

as having an erga

omnes

character

KAMMINGA, supra note
known

"°

See

to international

1

5

law as

in

1, at 153.
it

its

policy of racial discrimination, a right that the court classified

the Barcelona Traction case.

The court reasoned

stands at the present.

KAMMINGA, supra note

ICJ Reports

that the counterpart

(

1

966)

at 5

1

.

See also

of an actio popular

KAMMINGA, supra note

151,

is

not

at 194.

151, at 157.

'''
Id.

^^^

Mat
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See

160-161.

KAMMINGA,

supra

x\o\t 151, at 158.

prohibits any derogation from the right to

inhumane treatment under

life

The

International

under

Covenant on Civil and

article 6, the right against torture or

article 7, the right against slavery

and servitude under

Political Rights

any other

article 8, tic.Id.
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peremptor>' norms, norms of

breaches

constituting

international

human

rights having an erga

international

community

crimes

is

rights violations are considered as being

community.

is

such

as

of special importance for

most serious

assaults

on

all

members of

specific obligations

community

on

states

as a whole.

affecting the international

community

community.

as a whole, and

injuries," those that affect the entire international

position as follows:

^''

which are defined as
for the different kinds

"International law

of norms

278

human

rights

which may be called "universal

community,

differs

from

unilateral

and

injuries to a particular aggrieved party or

of injuries also

differ.

must evolve along the same

Ago

expressed this

lines as municipal

KAMMINGA, supra note 5 at 59.
MALANCZUK, supra note 172, at 233.
1

^'"

set

277

and whose fulfillment represents an increased

Therefore, the remedy that should be sought for certain kinds of

The remedies

The ILC

of responsibility, namely international derelicts and international

collective interest of the part of the entire international

parties.

the

between different kinds of international wrongful acts which

This trend of development, noted the ILC, signifies the emergence of a

multilateral injuries,

the

a "need for universal

is

international order."

crimes, classifying the latter as crimes against the international

which place

by

premised on the idea that these human

This principle affirms that there

also attempted to distinguish

dictate different kinds

"recognition

27S

solidarity in dealing with the

obligation and those

For example, the ICJ classification of certain

as a whole."

kinds of violations as obligation erga omnes

international

their

omnes

1

,

1

'''
Id.

^"

See R.
278,.
Id. at 3

^''^See

AGO, STATE RESPONSIBILITY,

2 (1976).

1

ELIZABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL

99(1985).

LAW THROUGH US LEGISLATION

89
law and derive

at a distinction

between two kinds of breaches: those affecting only the

injured state and those which, instead, affect the
this analogy, the

community

law, and this law

interest in the

community of Nations."

municipal legal system

280

According

protected by public

is

enforced through the use of coercive measures by the state in the

is

name and behalf of

the

community.

28

i

However, because victims of human

violations do not, as a general rule, have a voice in the international arena,
violations

must be addressed

282

differently, through a "special

by sporadic

rather than

regime,"

unilateral measures.

system of sanctions where the world community interest
to

to

is

rights

human

mechanism and

right

a special

The presence of an organized
maintained

is

similarly a trend

be followed in the international legal order.

The
breaching

its

undesirability of resorting to

human

rights obligation

is

economic countermeasures against a

reflected in

many forms and

the 38th session of the General Assembly, the representative of the

in

many

state

forums. At

German Democratic

Republic spoke as follows in the sixth committee:

The concept

that

one or several

states

could punish another state might

would
system, which

lead to the elimination of the sovereign equality of state. ..Its result

not be to strengthen but to

was based on

weaken

the international legal

the duty of peaceful cooperation

different, sovereign states...

among

equal, albeit very

283

Collective economic sanctions, reflecting a collective interest, are usually

regarded as having widespread legitimacy.

280

AGO,

supra note 278,

Thus, a measure taken by an international

at 32.

^*'/^.at49.
282

Georges Abi-Saab, The Concept of "International Crimes " and Its Place in contemporary
International Law. in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF

ILC'S

DRAFT ARTICLE

19

ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY

283

E/C.6/38/ SR.4, para. 67,

cf.

Also a/C.6/35/SR.49, para. 5)

144 (Weiler

et al., eds.,1989).

THE

90
organization would not be considered as an act of intervention, for

accorded

it

with a certain degree of authority, thus impHcitly recognizing

Although the
it

its

desirability of universal

economic sanctions

is

members have
284

its

of

authority.

less a concern,

has to be noted that the idea of collective responsibility should be applied

talks about holding a state responsible for

effect

its

acts

and impose a sanction

of economic sanction will harm the innocent nationals of the

when one

thereafter.

The

state violating the

norm, those same group of people which are victims of the violation of the norms of

human

rights, thus bringing

government"

285

"pain to innocents

Economic sanctions have

responsibility. This

however

is

much more

that to those responsible in

the inherent character of evoking collective

a price that has to be paid

,

if

sanctions are used for

legitimate purposes in a legitimate way. If sanctions are avoided

community because of

their

feature

of giving

rise

to

by the international

collective

responsibility,

"a

paradoxical situation arises, where countries committing crimes stand a great chance of

escaping forceful international reaction as long as they are run by despotic regimes or
dictators."^^^

The Competence of the United Nations

B.

At present, there

exists only

to

Deal with

Human

Rights.

one international organization whose objectives are

universal in nature: the United Nations.

The remedy

for the kinds

of human rights

violations that cause universal injuries to the legal interest of the international

and

^^"^

that

community

have a customary normative character, should be provided through the system of

Evan Luard, Collective

Intervention, in

ed.,1984)
285

See Korkeakivi, supra note 242,
Id. at 86.

at 85.

INTERVENTION

IN

WORLD POLITICS

159(Hedley Bui.,

91

community

the United Nations for the international

The legitimacy of

international

community

human

rights through various

use of coercive economic measures, finds

According

to the Charter,

its

member

rights in pursuance to article 3

The

legitimacy in the Charter of the organization

have agreed to promote and encourage

states

and have pledged themselves

to take joint

and

human

and

rights

without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

of these provisions has since been debatable. One writer for

legal effect

example has argued

all

the

mechanisms, including the

separate action to promote "the universal respect for, and observance of

fundamental freedom for

to

Moreover, the role of the United Nations as a

as a whole.

universal organ for enforcing

human

emanates from the universal nature of the

the measures

and the importance of certain kinds of human rights norms

organization

itself.

as a whole.

that the

endorsement of the word "pledge" manifestly provides a

duty on the states not to infringe the promotion of

Akehust expresses an opposite view by contending

human

that an

288

rights.

On

the other hand,

endorsement of the word

does not create a positive obligation on states to observe human

rights.

itself

As Akerust

wrote:

The use of
obligation

is

the

word "pledge". ..implies

probably not to observe

towards their fulfillment

a

human

legal
right

obligation,

but

the

law now... but to work

the future: the vagueness of the language

in

probably leaves a wide discretion to states about the speed and the means

of carrying out

their obligation,

no perceptible progress and

and

little

towards the realization of human
deliberately

moves backwards

it

is

notorious that in

many

countries

imperceptible progress, has been
rights.

as far as

On

the other hand, a state

human

probably be regarded as having broken

rights are

made
which

concerned would

article 56: certainly, this is the

287

The United Nations is the only organization that may be
omnes obligations. See ZOLLER, supra note 96, at 1.

288

directly

concerned with the breach of erga

See Kevin W. Ferguson Brown, the Legality of Economic Sanction Against South Africa in
Contemporary International Law, South Africa Yearbook of International Law, 63 (Vol. 14, 1988-1989).

92
attitude

of most members of the United Nations towards the South African

poHcy of apartheid."

Be

this as

it

may, the Charter of the United Nations has been

"constitutional

28Q

AKEHURST,

document"

to effectuate

laws of human

fully

be utilized as a

rights.

A Modem Introduction to International Law, 66-67 (6th ed.

1987).

93

1.

The Principle of Non-Intenention and the United Nations.

The United Nations Charter contains numerous human
Nonetheless, lack of

undermined

its

as well as lack

clarit>',

that precludes the organization

member

jurisdiction of the

states

of substantive and procedural provisions, has

One problem

legal effect."

is

from interfering

the inclusion of a provision in the Charter
in matters essentially within the

This primar>' tool was used as a defense by

states.

who had committed massive human

from any scrutiny based on the human

in

A

First, the application

respects.

is to

distinguish between

state

and those

human

of Article 2(7) does not

article 2(7) is

rights

that are protected

its

meaning

set a legal limitation

against the enforcement measures adopted under chapter VII of the Charter.

under

member

293

close reading of Article 2(7) illumines

294

two

of the Charter.

rights provision

domestic jurisdiction of a

under the international law regime.

domestic

rights violations to restrain the United Nations

In such kind of situation, the pressing task
that fall essentially within the

rights provisions.

Second,

only limited to areas which are essentially domestic and does not

290

See Articles
^^'

See

1(3). 13. 55,

56 of the United Nations Charter.

KAMMINGA, supra note

151

.

at 67.

292

Article 2(7) of the LTN Charter stipulates that "nothing that

UN

to intervene in matters

The argument
jurisdiction
security,

it

is

which

is

contained

in

the charter authorizes the

are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a

relating to the taking of a

measure by the United Nations

member

in the

state..."

areas of domestic

defeated by the assertion that once a matter constitutes a threat to international peace and

ceases to be, as a point of law, a matter falling "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of

a state, as improvised under article 2(7) of the Charter.
Article 2(7),

impeding
the rule

it

which seemingly created a

from interfering

by stating

KAMMINGA, supra note

294
Id.

competence of the organization by

that "this principle shall not prejudice the application

chapter VII."
^^^

limitation in the

domestic affairs of states, provides an exception to the application of

in the

1

5

1

,

at 67.

of enforcement measures under

94

The Charter of the United Nations

apply to matters which are othen^ise.

^

moreover, explicitly stated that one of

its

human

protection of

exercise direct pressure

purposes pertains to the promotion and

Yet, according to Lauterpacht, the notion of intervention,

rights.

as set forth in the Charter,

has,

limited to "dictatorial, mandatory interference intended to

is

upon the

state

concerned"

and has therefore a very

restricted

effect. Lillich wrote:

There has scarcely been a case of major proportions in which the
principle of domestic jurisdiction has not been invoked;

where

transnational effects have been precipitated, the principle has rarely

barred effective accommodation in accord with inclusive interest.

Hence, domestic jurisdiction means

community concession of

little

more than a general
competence

primar>', but not exclusive,

over matters arising and intimately concerned with aspects of
internal public order

inclusive

of

deprivations,

states.

inclusive concern and measures

The invocation of the

Where such

jurisdiction

become

is

principle of domestic jurisdiction for

The concept of domestic

is

major

human

human

rights

rights rests

on

and matters of

jurisdiction under international

law

not without exception, and those kinds of state conducts occurring within the territorial

bounds of the
been subject

state but

having a subsequent transnational effect upon others, have always

to decisions

and examinations on the international plane.

295
Id. at

67-68.

296

See An\c\ts
297

and

permissible.

a great misunderstanding in the contemporary nexus between
"international concern.""

acts precipitate

internationalized

1(3),

55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter.

RCADI 19-22 (1947).
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEM OF LAW,

H. Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, 70

298

See

RICHARD

B.

LILLICH,

POLICY AND PRACTICE 457(2nd
'''id.
'''id.

ed., 1991).
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The concept of domestic
immensely devolved with

jurisdiction in the United Nations Security Council has

The

practice.

Joint Declaration of the Security Council noted,

in its first head-of-state meeting, that:

The absence of war and

military conflict

ensure international peace and security.
instability in the

become

economic,

threats to peace

whole needs
301
^

a

social,

amongst states does not in itself
The non-military sources of

humanitarian and ecological fields have

and security. The United Nations membership as

give the highest priority to the solution of these

to

matters.

The Legitimacy of the Use of Economic Sanctions

2.

To Enforce Human Rights by

the Security Council of the United Nations

Although the United Nations Charter provides for the use of non-forcible
countermeasures in

its

institutional

framework of enforcement,

provides that unilateral third party remedies are not legal.

it

When

nonetheless clearly

an act of aggression

is

committed. Article 51 restrictively permits other states to take a provisional measure

means of

together with the victim as a

collective self-defense only until the Security

Council takes necessary measures to avert the danger.
states are not authorized,

where

Except for

this

kind of situation,

their interest is not directly affected, to take

any measure

because the power to determine the breach and to take the necessary measure to remedy

^^^

302

Note by the President of the Security Council,

The Security Council may determine

effect to

its

decisions, and

See Article 41 of the

Though
to

non

it

UN

it

may

call

UN Doc.

upon the members of the United Nations

to apply such measures.

not disputable that a state directly injured by the wrongdoing of another state

is

party

at 3.

Charter.

forcible unilateral actions, including the use of

when no

5/23500 (January 31, 1992),

the kind of non-forcible measures to apply in order to "give

is

directly affected

economic sanctions, the picture

is

may

by the international crime.

304

Graefrath, International Crimes:

A

Specific

Regime of International Responsibility and its Legal
ILC'S

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 166(Weiler et al., eds.,1982)

Consequences,

in

resort

entirely different

.

96
the wrongful act

is

This can by analogy be

exclusively vested in the Security Council.

applied to situations of

human

rights the breach

of which

may

constitute an international

crime or violations of erga omnes obligations. In such type of situations, unilateral

measures

to enforce

human

rights is not legitimate

and an enforcement measure must be

executed by the Security Council or other pertinent organ of the
Nations, like

from those of
utilized as a

all

UN. Since

the United

other international organizations, does not have a personality distinct

states

and

is

nothing more than the collection of

forum where the non-material

interest

its

members,

it

can be

of the international community could

be legitimately defended and enforced.
Professor Riphagen, in his report to the International
a view that a legal consequences follows upon states which

and thus

entails the rights
307

reprisals.

Despite

each and every

this,

state;

upon

all states to

Law Commission

commit an

,

rendered

international crime

take measures, including the right to take

he did not leave the exercise of

this right at the discretion

of

he advocated that the exercise of these rights should be "subject

mutatis mutandis to the procedures embodied in the United Nations Charter with respect
to the

maintenance of international peace and security."

In like manner,

Riphagen

proposed, in his part three of the draft article that the international Court of Justice be
vested with the power of qualifying certain "set of facts" as international crime.
true tenet

were

in creating a court that

would determine

His

if certain acts constitute

'''id
^'^

See

ZOLLER, supra note

96, at 104.

307
Article 14(1)(2) of the second part of the Draft Articles
Vol.11, Part
308

1,

at

On

State Responsibility,

W. Raphagen, Crimes of States: The Concept and Response,
STATES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ILC'S ARTICLE

(Weiler

et al.,

YB

of the ILC,

14 (1985). See also Kuyper, supra note 97, at 152-153.

1989)

in

19

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF
ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 260

an

97
international crime,

rights

and a security council which would thus determine and organize "the

and obligations of the world community arising as a

which include the

right to

omnes

in enforcing

norms of human

character or peremptory character or violations of what

"international crimes,"

is

international crime,

may

is

be labeled as

that

we

Violations of human rights that

Graefrath

automatic in any case of

which he characterizes as "a violation of obligation so

community

,

rights having

legitimate rather than being merely fair or equitable.

strongly asserts that the competence of the United Nations

international

of such a crime"

impose economic sanctions.

The competence of the United Nations
erga

result

essential to the

are faced with a matter of international concern."

fall

under the definition of an international crime cease to

be matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states directly affected,

human

because a breach of

essential for the protection

definition necessarily

is

rights is a "serious violation

of an international obligation

of fundamental interests of the international community by

an international affair which establishes the jurisdiction of the

United Nations."

The United Nations Security Council

is

the organ of the United Nations that can

legitimately take a mandatory measure in the event of a threat to international peace and

security.

But

competence
Article

it

is

within the practical reach of the Security Council to extend

to all kinds

39 of the

UN

of international crimes that
Charter,

may

its

be of international concern.

which authorized the Security Council with the

determination of the existence of peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

See Graefrath, supra note 237,

at 164.

98
bestows upon the Security Council "sufficient margin and discretionary power"

to

TIT

Once

address areas of international crime.

the Security Council determines that there

a "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or "act of aggression",

enforcement measures as provided under

under

articles

articles 41

it

can resort

is

to the

and 42, which leave

the Security council with the discretion of taking either a non-military measure. Article

41 empowers the Security Council to take measures not involving the use of armed force

and

call

upon member

states to act in

the Security Council have a mandator}' and binding nature

on member

Although the Security Council has never attempted
address the

human

right situation in a

member

rationale that a state's conduct within

transnational effect

upon other

the international plane.

states,

violation

rights

its

state,

own

it

to

states.

adopt resolution to directly

has done so indirectly under the

territorial

bounds has a subsequent

thus giving rise to a threat to peace and security on

The Security Council

matters which were once considered to

Human

These decisions of

compliance of such measures.^

constituting

consequences, which means that they

fall

is

extending

its

under the exclusive internal

international

fall

now

crime

fall

jurisdiction to

affairs

under

of

states.

Chapter

VII

under the definition of "threat to the peace,

breach of the peace or act of aggression" as provided under article 39 of the Charter.

^'^
Id. at

164-165.

314

These measures include complete or
postal, telegraph, radio,

partial interruption

of economic relations and of rail, sea,

and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic

air,

relations.

See

Article 41.

For instance, the Haiti

and gave

rise to a

crisis

humanitarian

threat to international peace

which resulted from
crisis

the

removal from office of the elected government

such as mass displacement of the population was considered to be "a

and security." See S.C. Res. 841, U.N.S.C.O.R, 48th

Sess.,

3238th mtg.,

ST/LIB/ 5.30(1993).
See Korkeakivi, supra note 242,
it

"[cjondemns the repression of the

at 90.

For example, the Security Council adopted a resolution where

Iraqi civilian population in

many

parts

of Iraq, including most

recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threatens international peace and
security...."

See S.C. Res.688,aA'.5'.C.a^, 2982nd mtg.

at 1.

99
Nevertheless, in the present state of affairs in international relations, the fairness if

not the legitimacy of economic sanction
in international politics.

may

be challenged, for lack of fair representation

The author of the paper conceives

violation by resorting to Chapter 7

would leave

,

at least in the

Security Council, the whole

mechanism of enforcement

of the

particularly

Security

Council,

in

those

that enforcing

rights

present structure of the

hands of the member

states

Permanent Members.

The

in the

of the

human

inappropriateness of giving "the task of identifying higher norms to a minority" and

placing a legal concept at the discretion of an organ which

have a negative consequence on the enforcement of human
continuance of United Nations sanctions against Iraq

humanitarian suffering, while

is

basically political,

is

3

rights.

1

For instance, the

said to have produced significant

served no legitimate international goal.

it

would

Creating an

enforcement organ in the United Nations which can function as the world police would be
indispensable to the reform of the present Security Council.

more democratic and

representative of the international

The organ should become

community

so that

its

mandatory

sanctions would be grounded on the conduct of states in reprisal of the law rather than as

an influence that tends to make international law subservient to the political goals of
powerful

states.

Nevertheless, even as
politically

it is

more acceptable than

now, a collective sanction enforcement

unilateral

economic sanctions, because the

vulnerable to the blatant manipulation of individual states.

""^/^. at 91-92.
3

1

See Krisknsky
319

Mat 4.

& Golove, supra note

156, at 3.

is

legally

latter is

and

more

CHAPTER VI
THE PROHIBITION OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

UNDER OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS.

The

A.

GATT and other Multilateral Instruments

The

GATT

is

a multilateral treaty in which the use of economic sanctions has

generally been prohibited with a certain exception.
establishes the requirement of nondiscrimination
duties under article

I

of the

GATT. As an

Article

between

states in order to effect their

exception, however, article

XXI of the GATT

recognizes the power of a contracting party to take "any action which

necessary for the protection of

Moreover,

this

article

its

entitles

essential security interests. "(article

member

pursuance of their obligation under the
peace and security."
not

made any

GATT

significant

security reasons.

countries to take

UN

GATT

XI of the

all

it

considers

XXI of the GATT).

necessary measures "in

Charter for the maintenance of international

1994, as propounded in the Uruguay round discussions, has

change

The remedy

in prohibiting the use

for breach

of the

of economic coercion except for

GATT

rules takes several forms: a

withdrawal of economic concession, a most Favored Nations Treatment, or a

agreement or any other discriminatory treatment pertaining

320

See The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, 1947.

100

to trade,

and

it

is

tariff

illegal

101
unless
state

it

can be justified for security reasons. Once again, the

does not, as a matter of practical

except

human

rights violation in a

reality, affect the security interest

of another

state,

m certam narrow circumstances. 321
Regional instruments are also concurrent with the view that unilateral economic

sanctions are prohibited.

American

The 1948 Bogota

States, offers a provision

Charter,

which created the Organization of

on the principles of nonintervention.

prohibits "the use of coercive measures of an

economic or

force the sovereign will of another state and obtain from

B. Regional Understandings on the

it

It

expressly

political character in order to

advantages of any kind."

Use of Economic Coercion

To Enforce Human Rights
According

to

its

Resolution 1994/47 entitled

Economic Coercive Measures,"

the

for the realization

of human

Commission

at its fifty-first

and

their

session on the

Accordingly, the Secretary General prepared a report

which contained statements and consultations from governments.
cultural peculiarity

the

implemented against the developing countries

unilaterally

rights.

Rights and Unilateral

Commission on Human Rights requested

Secretary General to submit a report to the

economic coercive measures

"Human

philosophy of human

rights, the writer

Because of

their

has elected the views

expresses by China and Indonesia. The views are summarized as follows.

321

A human

right violation in the territory

of one

violating state. For example, after the military
Haiti, a

humanitarian

neighboring

state,

crisis

state

may

give rise to a huge flux of refugees from the

coup overthrew the democratically elected government of

took over which resulted

in the

mass displacement of the population to the
The Security Council decided that this

thus endangering the security of other states.

state

of affairs constitutes a "threat to international peace and security" and imposed sanction on Haiti. See S.C.
Res. 841, U.N.
"''^^

324

5ee

article

SCOR, 48th Sess.. 3238 mtg., St/LIB/SER.B/
16, UNTS, Vol. 119, at 3.

5.30 (1993).

See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on

item

1

1

of the Provisional Agenda,

Human

Human

Rights, Fifty-First session,

Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures, Report of the

Secretary General, E/CN. 4/ 1995/43, Jan. 13, 1995.
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China

1.

China expressed the view
particular historical

its

concept of

that a country's

and cultural outlook and

is

human

also influenced

and economic conditions of the individual country.

"'

rights

by the

depends upon

social, political

Diversity in historical as well as

background must be "acknowledged and respected" and the human rights

cultural

standards of certain countries are not absolute; consequently, total conformity should not

be required.
their

"

Tr>'ing to

implementation

relations

between

is

impose these values by conditioning economic assistance on

not workable and

states.

"

Chma

is in

contravention of the principle of normal

also expressed the opinion that

not important in countries in which the primary necessities of

life

human

rights issues are

are not guaranteed

where people do not have adequate food and clothing. These countries must focus
efforts

on

their

and

their

primary needs. China also underlined that efforts to pressure developing

countries through economic and political

means

to

change

their

economic and

political

paths contrary to their free will demonstrated not only a "lack of respect for other
countries' sovereignty [but also constituted] a brutal violation of their peoples' rights to

life

3

and

to

development."

Indonesia
Unilateral

conditionalities

'''
'''

328

Id

Id

'''id

economic coercion, be

it

on the provision of economic

in the

form of an economic embargo or

aid, is not

consonant with the very principle

103

of international cooperation which brought nations under the umbrella of brotherhood and
often results in unjustifiable

Indonesia also

recognized

Development produces

harm

linkage

the

"fuller

to the innocent society

and other vulnerable groups.

between human

and more secure human

and development.

rights

rights,

while the implementation

and promotion of human rights as part of the national development
energies and genius of a people so that they can

become more

own

rejects

development."

implementation of

Indonesia,

human

however,

efforts releases the

effective agents of their

concept

the

that

rights as a political condition to the granting

cooperation and assistance, for the effect of this linkage

329

is

the

links

of economic

counter productive and

detractive for the value of both.

C. Economic Sanctions and Their Negative impact

The debate on human
foundation of
political rights

chapter

III

human

rights.

rights

Nor

is it

is

not

On

limited

to

the Right to Development
controversy on the cultural

confined to the issue of the primacy of

on the one hand, and economic and

social rights

for an elaborate discussion). International

on the

issue,

in the

depending upon which group of countries are propounding the

The

right to

development

is

other.(refer

development has been

of the controversy, and human right have been placed somewhere

civil

at the

this

idea.

right to seek

development assistance.

"' Id
See

to

center

paradigm of

T

^" Id

back

one of the constituent elements of the international

law of development, the other being the

332

and

CLAUDE & WESTON, HUMAN RIGHTS

IN

WORLD COMMUNITY

134 (1989)

•>

-3

The

104

development was classified

right to

known

as "third generation"

human

in a

new

categor>'

rights.

The concepts of "equity" and "common
right to

interest" are the rationales

behind the

development and the responsibility of the international community, mainly

developed members,
justice."

of human rights which came to be

^'

The following passage expresses
Development

a condition of

is

"new

achieve the objective of a

help

to

social

the present trend of thinking in the area:

all

requirement of every obligation.
united with each other if they

international

its

social life

and therefore, an inherent

Individuals and nations can only be

And, as we have

first exist.

just seen,

human societies are a function of
human potentialities and of a
corresponding increase in material goods. To reject development as a
primary obligation would be to reject the humanization of man and
individual existence and the existence of

progress, in other words, of the expansion of

therefore to deny the very possibility of a moral system.

""^

See BULAVIC, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LAW: PROGRESSIVE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 362(1993). The right to development is defined in the following

ways

in the

1986 Declaration of the General Assembly on the Progressive Development of Principles of

International
6.1

The

particular,

6.2

By

results

Law

right to

and

is

Relating to a

development

New

is

International

a principle

Economic Order:

of public international law

in

general and of human right law

in

based on the right to self-determination of people;

virtue of the right to

of the efforts of

development as

states, individually

order for the implementation of the

human

a principle of

human

rights law, peoples are entitled to the

and collectively, to achieve a proper social and international
right, set forth in the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

through a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process based upon their free and active
participation.

6.3 TTie right to

development as a principle of public international law imposes the cooperation of states for

the elaboration of civil, cultural, economic, political and social standards,

U.N. and the international
recognized

human

rights

and Co-operation among
^^^

^^^

See generally
F.V.

Id. at

Bill

of

Human

Rights, based

and of the principles of Public
States.

Id

at

embodied

in the

Charter of the

common understanding of the generally
International Law concerning Friendly Relations

upon

a

384.

375-390.

GARCI- AMADOR, THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL

DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Involvement in Development).

8

1

(

1

LAW OF DEVELOPMENT: A NEW

990)(c///«g J.M.

Domenach Our Moral
,
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The importance of

the idea of development

was so mush feh

Nations General Assembly asserted, as early as 1979.

development

much

a

is

human

right

and

United

that the

in its resolution that "the right to

of opportunity for development

that equality

is

as

a prerogative of nations as of individuals within nations."

Very important

to the content

economic coercion on the

rights of

of the present paper

development and the

the negative impact of

is

legal ramification thereof.

It is

noteworthy that the General Assembly has designated the non-use of economic sanctions
as an important prerequisite in the realization of the right to development.

"no

state

may be

Also evolving
is

mainly by

affirmed

Assembly resolution
for

Women.

that

It

338

the concept of the right to seek development assistance; this

is

unacceptable by donor countries.

Decade

stated that

subjected to economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent

the free and full exercise of their inalienable rights."

approach

It

A

developing

countries

was adopted

at the

sabotage..."

Thus

is

found

World Conference of
all

rejected

in the

as

General

the United Nations

developing countries to decide freely

from which countries and international agencies they
"all acts

mostly

is

recent assertion to this effect

affirmed "the right of

and condemned

and

will seek

development assistance"

of destabilization, economic and political blackmail, threat or

the resolution prohibited the use of

economic coercion because

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 34/46, November 23, 1979, para.
concept that "the right to development

is

8.

TTiis resolution

its

reaffirmed the

an inalienable right" and maintained that "international peace and

security are essential elements in achieving the full realization of the right to development," thereby

recognizing that "all

human

rights

and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent." See

General Assembly Resolution 39/145. 1984, para.
at

8, 9, 10.

For more discussion. See

UN

BULAJIC, supra

note,

365 (citinp
E/CN.4/1 985/1

339

1/,

See Resolution 26,

Annex,

On

at 1.

the Right

ofAll Countries

to

Seek Development Assistance From Any And All

106
use would inevitably have an impact the promotion of this right.

From Threats And Attacks, Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade
Women. Copenhagen, July 14-30, 1980, UN, Doc. A/ Conf. 94/35, at 88.

Sources Free

for

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

Countermeasures under international law

Of particular

interest is the

that a state or

group of

refer to a large category

of sanctions.

economic sanction. Economic sanctions are countermeasures

states utilizes against another state

with the purpose of inducing

compliance of the breached obligation or compliance with the demands of the same.
There has ever been a long standing debate on the issue of whether economic
sanctions are forcible or non-forcible countermeasures.
reprisal to enforce a legal right

Charter.

was abolished with

The use of

force as a form of

the birth of the United Nations

Therefore, any attempt to inject economic sanction into the content of use of

force

would automatically preclude the same as

law.

For

this reason, the issue

tools of self-remedy under international

of the validity of unilateral economic sanction must be

limited to those principles of international law that pertain to the use of non-forcible

countermeasures.

Countermeasures are principally divided into two types: reprisals and retorsions.

They

differ in that

Retorsions

is

does not give

one produces a legal effect and the other generally does

generally considered the attribute of the state's sovereignty
rise to the application or invocation

107

whose

not.

exercise

of any prior breach of international law.

108
Thus, retorsion

is

a countermeasure that a state

induce compliance with

toward another
state,

the

Although

not absolute, as

it is

same

state.

right

by other

be examined in

light

legal obligations or

its

its

this right

may

use to enforce

legal rights, to

simply to perform an unfriendly act

emanates basically from the sovereign right of a

absolute unregulated exercise

states.

its

may

The use of economic coercion

contradict the exercise of

as an act of retorsion should

of the contemporar>' development of the law

in the area

and the rule

against non-intervention and sovereignty under general international law.

The
is

principle of non-intervention, as practiced under customar\' international law,

intended to protect states from being unduly influenced by other states. Although a

sense of disagreement prevails in drawing the line where a state's conduct ceases to be an
exercise of a sovereign
a state's use of

power

to an act

economic retorsion

of interference, many agree that the motive behind

is

of primary importance. The economic conduct

should not be designed to impact on or interfere with the political independence of a
If the

meant

economic coercion does not impact on the
to attain

an economic benefit,

sanction-imposing state and

measures
state,

is

it

political

and

its

of domestic jurisdiction of the other

own

nationals

intervention, for they interfere in the domestic decision

may amount

making process of a

to acts

is

solely dependent

obligation of another state.

of

state.

the other hand, reprisals presuppose the taking of countermeasures,

of which

is

permitted as a per se retortive right. The use of economic

including the treatment of a state of

legality

state

should be justifiable as a sovereign effect of the

that are utilized to influence the exercise

On

independence of the

state.

the

on the existence of a prior breach of an international

The general acceptance of non-forcible countermeasures-

which may include the suspension or withdrawal of a

legal obligation-as legitimate

under

109
international law, establishes per se the legal validity of

economic coercion

as a type of

non-forcible countermeasure.

Preceding any serious discussion of the international enforcement of human rights

must be a determination of those groups of human

Only then can one

universal acceptance.

norms.

It is

result

mechanism through which
is

how economic

A

about the universal enforcement of these

talk

of their seriousness.
these special

A

norms can be

protected.

sanctions can be applied to enforce

unilateral use

its legality, its

vulnerability to political abuse

law

to violations

human

are

still

is

important to this

rights.

and

its

state is illegitimate in light

effect

of a particular

few

of

on disrupting "international

of erga omnes obligations and violations of

frameworks

that are representative

of the

should be

interests

community, unless the violations have caused material damage

international

A

What

that are categorically recognized as being international crimes

carried out through institutional

interest

special respect

of economic sanctions by states not directly affected by the

Remedies applied

international

command

second question relates to the legal

wrongful human rights practices on the nationals of a given

legality."

have achieved the benefit of

an accepted fact that certain norms of human rights

and treatment as a

paper

rights that

of the
to

the

state.

factors are important in this consideration.

A

number of "human

rights"

debatable as to their universality, content importance and classification. In the

absence of any definitive understanding of the values of
generates from

mechanisms

its

human

origins, scope, hierarchy, classification, etc.,

as instruments for imposing their values

rights

some

on other

whose ambiguity

states

states.

may

Such a

use such
unilateral

determination of sanctions leaves the sanction-imposing state to decide on certain matter

no
with ethno-centric bias which in return gives rise to the imposition of values

.

Therefore,

the validity of unilateral sanction can be challenged on the ground that the cultural and
political values

face of the

still

controverted universality of

all

kinds of

of the human rights situation

unilateral determination

influenced

may have

of the country enforcing the sanction

in a

by consideration of subjective as opposed

a discernible effect in the

human

given country
to

objective

Moreover, breaches of human rights obligations would be subjected
unilateral use

of sanction which leaves

its

Second, a

rights.

is

very

much

considerations.

to

an arbitrary

enforcement uncoordinated and ineffective.

Therefore, unilateral sanctions are very likely to be abused.

Indirectly injured states

should not be allowed to use economic sanctions, either unilaterally or multilaterally.
Collective sanctions above

all

from the multilateral agreement of

imposed only

desirable due to their legitimacy,

states

such as the Charter of the

for violations of those kinds of

human

acceptance. Universal enforcement of human rights

rights

is

which emanates

UN. They can be

norms which have a universal

permissible only in cases of breach

of norms of special importance such as international crimes and obligation erga omnes.

The

practices of genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, torture, etc., are included in the

special group of

fall

under the

community
rights.

The

as a

human

rights that

international

criminal

whole has the

international

have either a peremptory or erga omnes character or
law regime.

Consequently,

right to take necessary

community should

measures

the

international

to protect these basic

act through an international organization

having a universal nature.

The advantage of

collective sanctions

is

twofold.

First, the larger the

number of

nations engaged in the sanction, the lower the likelihood that the target state could easily

Ill

A

circumvent the economic impact.
relatively expedient

economic

loss,

may minimize

be used to be effective, resulting
population of the target

state.

universal

in a

sanction,

coupled with the

the time that

target's

economic sanction must

lower threshold of suffering of the innocent

Second, collective sanction

is

usually imposed as a result

of a violation of a certain legal or customar>' norm. The endorsement of sanction by an
international organization, therefore, reflects the importance of the breached

world community

at

large, thus eliminating the

norm

to the

imposition of controversial values.

Sanctions carried out by an international organization also are vested with a strong moral

power, compared with that of sanctions directed unilaterally, since the international
organization has a broad perspective rather than a narrowly defined national or hidden
interest.

The authority of

the United Nations to act in the field of

sometimes challenged on the ground

that

human

rights

is

such an exercise violates the principle of non-

intervention as improvised under article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations.

Nonetheless, the

UN Charter has envisaged the promotion and protection of human rights

as one of the purposes of the organization. Therefore, any activity of the United Nations

in this respect

should not be taken as an

illegal exercise

The enforcement of norms of human
factors as culture, stage of

of power.

rights should also be cognizant

economic development,

etc.

of such

Enforcement by the United

Nations removes the fear that the values of some cultures will be imposed on others. The

United Nations can be utilized as an international forum through which universally
recognized notions and principles of human rights

of a peculiar or limited acceptance.

may be implemented

rather than values

Unless economic sanctions are used

in a systematic

LAW LIBRARY
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and organized way,

their liabilities

may outweigh

their benefits

and consequently produce

detrimental effects on the interest of populations they are supposed to help.

Generally, universal economic sanctions as a tool for enforcing

have

two

clear

advantages

relative/comparative altruism.

altruistic

that are

over

unilateral

economic

sanctions:

rights

legitimacy

and

The use of these sanctions acquire the advantage of

humanitarian concern, as compared with camouflaged

mainly instigated by

human

self-interest. Therefore,

human

norms of human

right concerns

rights

character have to be enforced through an institution having a similar feature.

of universal
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